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Abstract 
 
Managing water quality is of critical interest to policy-makers in New Zealand 
and globally.  In particular, the management of diffuse nitrate losses from 
agriculture is a major policy challenge that remains largely unsolved.  In a policy 
environment with a strong emphasis on collaboration, consideration has been 
given to whether groups of resource users can address the issue collectively at a 
catchment scale. Although water quality is not a traditional common pool resource 
problem, in the presence of some form of external threat or regulation associated 
with degradation, the diffuse loss of nitrate to waterways is transformed into a 
common pool resource problem.  This social dilemma is characterised by strong 
incentives to defect and challenging levels of complexity.  However, these 
challenges are not insurmountable. 
 
This study uses economic experiments to present groups of participants with a 
stylised version of the problem faced by resource users in the field.  Previous 
experiments in this area have found sanctions to be of limited effectiveness in this 
environment in the absence of communication.  We extend previous studies by 
adjusting the ratio of the cost of sanctions to their effectiveness, and by varying 
the overall payoff environment.  We find that more effective sanctions are able to 
improve environmental outcomes and stabilise the level of resource use over time, 
even in the absence of communication.  However, there are significant costs 
associated with the use of sanctions which mean that overall welfare is not 
enhanced in the absence of communication. 
 
Due to the complexity of common pool resource management, communication 
and agreement about norms for resource use levels is important to support groups 
in optimising environmental outcomes and profitability.  Communication is a 
necessary condition for maximising welfare when navigating complexity.  
However, communication is not necessary to improve environmental outcomes or 
sustain a level of resource use over time. 
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While some self-selected groups of highly-cooperative individuals may be able to 
sustain cooperation in the absence of sanctions, these arrangements are unlikely to 
be stable over time.  The presence of defectors means that some form of recourse 
to punishment is necessary to support the continued sustainable management of a 
resource. The strong incentives for defection in common pool resource 
management, including collective management of water quality, can be overcome 
by sufficiently strong sanctions.   
 
Our experimental findings suggest that sanctions administered by peers can be 
effective in improving environmental outcomes and stabilising the level of 
resource use over time, preventing the decline in cooperation that is evident where 
individuals are able to profit from defection.  The cost and effectiveness of 
sanctions has a strong interaction with the nature of the incentive environment.  In 
designing institutions for the collective management of nitrate loads to water 
bodies, regulators and groups of resource users must consider the incentives for 
defection that are driven by the degree of coupling of nitrate losses and 
profitability in farm systems.  In order to be successful, group members must have 
access to low-cost sanctions that are designed with the incentive environment in 
mind.  If institutions can be designed in such a way as to ensure that cheaters do 
not prosper from defection, the prospects for collective management of water 
quality are positive. 
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1. Introduction and background 
 
Freshwater management is a critical issue for regional and national governments 
worldwide.  Increasing pressure on the resource from extraction and pollution has 
caused management to reach a crisis point in many areas.  As freshwater is of 
critical economic, social and cultural importance to human societies, resolving 
approaches to management is important and urgent.  In New Zealand, the 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management was introduced in 2011, 
requiring limits to be set for both quality and quantity for all freshwater bodies.  
This was strengthened in 2014 with the addition of a set of national bottom lines, 
setting minimum standards for water quality (New Zealand Government, 2014).  
Regional councils are now required to set limits and to manage activities to 
achieve these limits.  However, how councils are expected to achieve this is not 
prescribed.  Indeed, the methods being introduced to achieve limits are as diverse 
as the freshwater management issues that present themselves throughout the 
country (Ministry for the Environment, 2015a).   
 
Embedded within this policy setting is a shift towards more collaborative 
approaches to setting policy and rules, as well as more collaborative approaches to 
management (Ministry for the Environment, 2015b).  Given the strong impetus 
towards group problem solving, it is perhaps unsurprising that collective 
approaches towards freshwater management have gained considerable attention.  
However, policy-makers and resource users are now utilising models of collective 
management in areas where they have been previously untested, such as in the 
broad area of water quality.  Although the commitment towards collaboration is 
generally strong in terms of both politics and implementation, the approach is still 
very new.  Much remains unknown about how this new collaborative approach to 
environmental governance will be sustained.  
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1.1 Freshwater in New Zealand 
 
Freshwater quality has many different components.  Clarity, suspended sediment, 
nutrient levels, algal growth, dissolved oxygen, biodiversity and the impact of 
endangered species are all affected by different drivers that interact dynamically 
(Ballantine & Davies-Colley, 2013).  In the relatively short history of New 
Zealand, the dominant drivers and attendant states have changed dramatically. 
Vegetation clearance by Māori is likely to have had some impact by accelerating 
erosion, but this would have been relatively modest in terms of ecological 
disturbance.  Significant degradation began with European settlement.  
Settlements discharged untreated sewage directly to surface waters (and this still 
occurs in many areas as significant rain tends to overwhelm existing 
infrastructure).  Mining booms resulted in toxic contamination with persistent 
long-term effects for some areas.  Also, across the entire country, deforestation 
caused accelerated erosion, which has supported a legacy of sedimentation and 
flooding.  Government policy focused on settlement and economic development 
accelerated and worsened these impacts.  For example, subsidies for clearing 
erosion-prone hill country for unprofitable farming operations persisted well into 
the 1980s (Parliamentary Comissioner for the Environment, 2012).   
 
The dominant change to freshwater environments over the last half-century has 
been increasing levels of nutrients (Ballantine & Davies-Colley, 2013).  Rapid 
expansion of towns and factories has resulted in increasing numbers of point-
source discharges to freshwater bodies.  The use of phosphate fertiliser since the 
1960s enabled an enormous increase in agricultural productivity, increasing the 
carrying capacity of pastures several times over.  However, agricultural land use 
intensity has increased steadily ever since, supporting ever-greater levels of 
production, but also waste in the form of diffuse nutrient losses (Parfitt et al., 
2012).  Since the introduction of the Resource Management Act 1991, significant 
progress has been made in reducing the impacts of many point-source discharges 
on freshwater.  While farming practices have also improved in terms of improving 
nutrient use efficiency, their relative contribution to the nutrient enrichment of 
water bodies, compared to point sources, has grown.  In addition, the trend of 
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increasing intensity has driven increases in nitrogen levels in many areas (Parfitt 
et al., 2012; Parliamentary Comissioner for the Environment, 2012). 
 
1.2 Agriculture and non-point source pollution 
 
Nutrients (particularly nitrogen and phosphorus) are essential to supporting 
freshwater ecosystems.  However, excessive levels can cause undesirable algal 
blooms, which increase the diurnal oscillation in dissolved oxygen levels, making 
the water unsuitable for fish (Matheson, Quinn, & Hickey, 2012).  At very high 
levels, nitrates can also have direct toxic effects on freshwater fauna and make it 
unsuitable for human consumption (Hickey & Martin, 2009; World Health 
Organization, 2004).  Following early success with the regulation of point-source 
discharges, attention has now turned to the management of diffuse losses of 
nitrogen and phosphorus from agriculture, often referred to in the literature as 
non-point source pollution (Shortle & Horan, 2001).   
 
The most effective management approaches for nitrogen and phosphorus losses 
from agriculture are very different.  As phosphorus binds to soil particles, there 
are a range of options at a farmer’s disposal which enable effective mitigation (for 
example, through stock exclusion and riparian planting) that are largely decoupled 
from production.  Nitrate-nitrogen, however, is much more costly to manage 
(Monaghan et al., 2007).  While higher nitrogen use efficiency allows for some 
increase in production within given environmental boundaries, rates of nitrate 
leaching will always bear some relationship to the overall intensity of production 
in a catchment (Clapcott, Young, Goodwin, Leathwick, & Kelly, 2011).   
 
Because of this coupling of nitrogen loss and production, the mitigation of 
nitrogen involves a more conventional convex relationship between abatement 
and abatement cost, compared to phosphorus.  This makes management much 
more challenging, as it is not a simple matter of prescribing a particular 
technology to fix the problem.  Where any significant level of mitigation is 
required beyond reasonable efficiency gains, there will be significant implications 
for profitability (Doole & Kingwell, 2015).  Given the incentive structure 
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surrounding the abatement of nitrogen loss from farms, some form of on-going 
management is likely to be required, whether it is through regulation of 
individuals or groups. 
 
Expense is not the only challenge.  There are several characteristics of agricultural 
non-point source pollution that make it difficult to regulate individual firms.  In 
particular, the existence of multiple polluters, information asymmetries, complex 
transmission pathways and stochastic environmental influences make non-point 
source pollution problems fraught with uncertainty and unobservability (Shortle & 
Horan, 2001).  Agricultural non-point source pollution is also characterised by 
natural variability, and is often relatively local scale (Romstad, 2003; Xepapadeas, 
1992).  The impact of natural variability is a product of processes such as weather 
and climate, as well as the responses of firms to these changes in conditions.  
Measurement of firm-level emissions under these conditions becomes 
prohibitively expensive (Suter, Vossler, Poe, & Segerson, 2008).  This has 
hampered efforts to address the problem for decades (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2012).  
 
The instruments typically used to address pollution problems can be characterised 
into three broad classes: 
 Performance-based (focused on actual outputs such as kilograms of 
nitrogen leached), 
 Management-based (focused on actions taken such as irrigating effluent 
from dairy sheds in a way that avoids runoff), and 
 Technology-based (implementing particular technologies such as riparian-
buffer planting). 
 
Coglianese and Lazer (2003) propose a useful framework for showing the 
different strengths of these three approaches to environmental management, 
represented pictorially in figure 1.  Where the polluting firms are highly 
homogenous with respect to a particular problem, it can be effective to target 
regulation towards a particular technology.  Where firms are more diverse, 
regulation tends to focus on management or performance-based instruments.   
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Because of the information problems associated with non-point source pollution, 
regulation has typically focused on the implementation of technologies or 
management practices that are correlated with environmental impacts – for 
example, fertilisation, manure spreading or tillage (Doole, 2010; OECD, 2012).   
 
Figure 1: Relative suitability of different regulatory approaches 
 
 
 
(Coglianese & Lazer, 2003) 
 
Technology and management-based regulatory approaches have been effective in 
some areas, but in others, policies have failed (for instance, in controlling nitrate 
leaching) (OECD, 2007).  Although inputs and pollutant loads are often 
correlated, these technologies and practices are not sufficiently connected to the 
level of observed nitrate loss to be an effective means of control.  For example, 
fertiliser use may explain only 30 per cent of nitrate losses from a given farm 
system, with large variation attributable to the efficiency of input use or natural 
variability.  More direct, performance-based approaches would be preferable from 
both an environmental and an efficiency perspective (Doole, 2012; Romstad, 
2003).  Moreover, the regulation of inputs has to be very broad-ranging if 
High
High
Low
Low
Homogeneity of entities
Capacity 
to assess 
output
Technology-
based 
instruments
Performance-
based 
instruments
Management-
based 
instruments
 6 
producers are not to adapt through substituting regulated factors of production 
with other polluting inputs.  For example, banning nitrogen fertiliser can reduce 
nitrogen loss from farming systems, but can also provide a strong incentive to 
increase supplement feeding, which erodes any environmental benefit accruing to 
the ban placed on nitrogen application (Doole, 2010). 
 
By taking a performance-based approach to regulation, management behaviour 
also becomes directly connected to the underlying incentive structure that is 
driven by the abatement-cost relationship.  Where these costs are large, the 
incentives to not comply with regulation become significant.  In the context of 
group management that is being considered in some areas, the incentives to 
defect, to the detriment of the welfare of the resource management group as a 
whole, become significant. 
 
1.3 Collective approaches to managing freshwater quality  
 
Numerous examples exist of using a collective approach to the management of 
water quantity for irrigation (Cox & Ross, 2011; Meinzen-Dick, 2007).  Indeed, 
many small irrigation schemes in New Zealand use a collective approach.  
However, such approaches are not uniformly successful and there are a number of 
limitations (Meinzen-Dick, 2007).  Water quantity, in contrast to water quality, is 
relatively easily defined as a resource system.  Consequently, this has made the 
establishment of user boundaries somewhat easier in that the supply can always be 
turned off.  The highly visible act and results of irrigation also make monitoring 
relatively straightforward (even more so with the modernisation of irrigation 
systems and the incorporation of water metering and telemetry).  However, 
increased difficulty does not mean it is impossible to apply a common property 
approach to water quality.   
 
A number of collective efforts by farmers to address water quality issues have 
already occurred in New Zealand.  The Aorere Catchment Project and Lake 
Rerewhakaaitu Catchment Action Plan are examples (Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council, 2012; New Zealand Landcare Trust, 2012).  In the case of the Aorere 
 7 
project, a number of dairy farmers made collective efforts to reduce bacterial 
impacts from farm dairy effluent on local mussel farms.  The Rerewhakaaitu 
project included measures in relation to effluent, riparian planting and nutrient 
management.  However, no such group currently exists focused chiefly on the 
management of nitrate.  While the large incentives for defection that characterise 
the problem undoubtedly make collective management of nitrate losses more 
challenging, there are a number of reasons to suppose that a group approach might 
be desirable. 
 
A particular feature of the non-point source pollution problem is that it often 
occurs at a relatively local scale, where resource users tend to be in relatively 
close contact.  This has two important consequences.  First, the scale and potential 
for group cohesiveness lend the situation towards collective action or group 
management (Romstad, 2003).  Second, users within the group may have an 
information advantage relative to regulators, due to their ability to partially 
observe their neighbours’ behaviour (for example, noticing effluent spills, poor 
cultivation practices or additional, undeclared bought-in feeds and nutrients) 
(Seabright, 1993).  In managing an environmental problem that is so 
fundamentally characterised by information problems, this information advantage 
could mean group management approaches are more effective than controls on 
individual firms by the state.  Finally, in the case of mitigating nitrogen loss, there 
is considerable scope to change the abatement curves do be less costly through 
increasing farmer skill (Doole & Kingwell, 2015).  However, achieving this 
profitable abatement through better nutrient management can be difficult, while 
the profit gains may be marginal (Pannell, 2006).  Furthermore, risk-averse 
farmers may choose not to pursue such practices and potential profits, owing to 
the complexity and uncertainty of impacts on their particular farm operation 
(Bosch & Pease, 2000).  In the face of skill barriers and uncertainty, group 
learning through a catchment community-based approach to water quality may 
offer a promising pathway towards sustainable water management (Dodd, 
Wilcock, & Parminter, 2009).  Indeed, there are a number of distinct advantages 
to building social capital through a common property approach, particularly in 
promoting long-term cultural sustainability (Aminova & Abdullayev, 2009; 
Burton & Paragahawewa, 2011). 
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1.4 Motivation  
 
There are two particularly troubling aspects for the potential success of collective 
approaches to managing nitrate losses, compared to managing other aspects of 
water quality or water quantity.  First, the economics of nitrate management are 
characterised by strong incentives for defection, unlike other aspects of water 
quality addressed through more simple technology or management changes.  Due 
to the relatively strong coupling of nitrate losses, land use intensity and profit, 
users can earn significant gains by deviating from agreed levels of nitrate loss.   
 
Second, groups that collectively manage nitrate lack an inherently strong sanction, 
such as the opportunity to restrict a user’s access to water in an irrigation scheme.  
Recent developments in the private sector suggest that sanctions could be 
developed to address this.  Milk companies in New Zealand have branched out 
into audited self-management for environmental matters in recent years, including 
the use of rewards and sanctions.  For example, Synlait offers price premiums for 
milk from suppliers that meet higher environmental standards (Synlait, 2016).  
Fonterra Cooperative Group has instituted a regime whereby continued non-
compliance with standards (including environmental standards) results in the 
company refusing to pick up milk from a supplier (Fonterra, 2007).  This is a 
particularly strong sanction due the high cost imposed on a farm unable to sell its 
milk.  Accordingly, this could be expected to induce a high level of cooperation in 
a group management situation, but this has only been applied at the nation-wide 
level so far, rather than in respect to a specific commons management issue. 
 
As there is growing interest in the potential to manage water quality through 
collective approaches, it is important to develop deeper understanding of the 
potential advantages and drawbacks through as many channels for research as 
possible.  One particularly promising channel for this is the use of economic 
experiments.  Experiments offer the advantage of systematically testing specific 
aspects of a particular issue, while still providing data based on the interactions of 
real people, rather than stylised models of economic actors.  The use of a 
laboratory environment enables a useful level of control over the parameters of 
the environment, supporting greater levels of attribution for a particular given 
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treatment variable.  Clear procedures enable the replication of experiments from 
one researcher to the next, which enables cumulative development of knowledge, 
as new experiments build on the results of previous experiments.  In addition (and 
of particular interest for policy development), laboratory experiments enable 
hypotheses about particular policies to be tested in a relatively low-cost 
environment.  Failed policies are expensive in both implementation costs and 
potentially adverse reactions to a policy.  While we can never be completely sure 
how a given scenario will translate from the laboratory to the field, initial 
experiments can provide insight into potential advantages, pitfalls and key design 
parameters (Fisher, Wheeler & Zwick 1993; Levitt & List, 2007; Ostrom, 2006). 
 
Collective management of nitrate losses offers a coordination problem typical of 
the design of many economic experiments concerned with public goods and 
common pool resources.  However, there is a critical gap in our understanding of 
how strong, non-linear incentives for defection (as found in the nitrate 
management problem) interact with sanctioning institutions within a decentralised 
management structure.  Previous research in the area has found sanctioning 
institutions to be relatively ineffective in this type of incentive environment in the 
absence of communication (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015; Cason & Gangadharan, 
2016; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992).  This is potentially problematic, as in 
the field, communication can be expected to break down periodically.  Members 
of the group will change over time.  Expectations and norms may not be clearly 
understood by new members.  People may enter groups that do not share the 
strong social capital that built the group in the beginning.  In these cases, 
communication may not be fully effective and free-riding (the capture of benefits 
that have not been paid for) may be attempted.  If this occurs, there is a risk that 
other members of a group may follow a free-rider and cooperation will break 
down, to the detriment of all group members and the environment.  Strong 
institutions are needed to overcome these periodic disturbances and ensure that 
other members of a group continue to see value in collective management, even 
when some individuals do not play by the rules.  
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1.5 Aims 
 
Experimental economics literature has provided many insights into the influence 
of norms, communication and monitoring on cooperation in social dilemma 
environments.  However, the findings in relation to sanctions in self-managing 
groups are mixed across different incentive environments.  In common-pool 
resource games, sanctions administered by group members have been found to be 
only marginally effective without communication (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015; 
Cason & Gangadharan, 2016; Ostrom et al., 1992).  It is possible that the 
complexity of these games causes confusion, leading to participants not 
understanding why they are being punished.  However, a systematic study of the 
influences of the effectiveness of sanctions and the incentive environment has not 
yet been undertaken. 
 
The central aim of this study is to determine whether strong sanctions 
administered by members of a group are able to improve cooperation in a 
collective management scenario where there are strong incentives to defect, no 
communication and complexity makes optimisation challenging.  Economic 
experiments are undertaken within an incentive environment designed to make a 
corollary for the dilemma faced by farmers engaged in collective management of 
nitrate loads to a water body.  By further developing our understanding of the 
relationship between incentives and sanctions, we hope to identify areas for focus 
by policy-makers in developing institutions to support collective management, 
ensuring that they are set up for success rather than failure. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Non-point source pollution and common pool resources  
 
Non-point source pollution is sometimes referred to as a common pool resource 
problem.  Common pool resources are typically renewable environmental goods 
that provide additional benefits with increased use, up to a point where the 
resource becomes degraded and benefits begin to decline (Hardin, 1968).  This 
benefit-maximising level of use is typically referred to as maximum sustainable 
yield.  Examples of common-pool resources include forests, fisheries and water 
resources used for irrigation.  In the context of pollution, the common resource is 
the capacity of a water body to assimilate contaminants.  However, there is one 
often critically-overlooked difference in this case.  One of the key conditions for 
successful CPR management is the salience of the resource condition to the 
livelihood of its users (Ostrom, 2008).  For example, if an irrigation resource 
becomes overused, then all users are negatively affected by reduced irrigation 
reliability.  This creates a strong motivation for the development of institutional 
arrangements to manage the resource effectively.  In the case of pollution, the 
degradation of the resource (assimilative capacity) does not affect the ability of 
users to provide for their livelihoods (through activities like farming or cropping).  
This means there is no direct inherent motivation for users to manage the resource 
better, thus complicating the management of the issue relative to where any 
detrimental effects of common pool management are experienced directly by the 
resource users.  This being said, external pressures from the broader community 
such as the threat of regulation have been known to drive collective action (Bay of 
Plenty Regional Council, 2012; New Zealand Landcare Trust, 2012).  In any case, 
non-point source pollution shares many other characteristics of common pool 
resources, particularly in relation to the factors that affect management.  If costs 
are imposed on users for the degradation of the resource, the incentive structure 
becomes identical. 
 
Costs associated with the effects of non-point source pollution might be sourced 
endogenously or exogenously.  In the first case, the source of cost for producers of 
non-point pollution is endogenous damage experienced directly as a result of their 
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actions.  For example, overall levels of nitrate leached from farming operations 
may breach drinking water standards for aquifers that farmers depend on for their 
own drinking water supplies.  There are few examples of this occurring in the 
field in a way that introduces sufficient incentives to stimulate collective action.  
In the second case, costs might be due to some form of group tax imposed by a 
regulator, as suggested by Segerson (1988).  In this case, failure to protect the 
resource as a group could be met by sanctions against all group members by the 
regulator.  This is problematic in reality, since producer benefits are unknown and 
costing environmental damage is difficult, making it difficult to determine the 
optimal tax level (Suter et al., 2008).  Nonetheless, a few examples of this 
approach to regulation now exist in the field.  For example, under the Everglades 
Forever Act in the United States, the government instituted a cropland tax based 
on aggregate phosphorus contamination from agricultural runoff (Athanassoglou, 
2010).  There is no evidence of the effectiveness of this programme however 
(certainly not within the academic literature). 
 
There are also instances in which the threat of more severe regulation has inspired 
collective action, where desired community environmental outcomes are not met 
(Kingi, Park, & Scarsbrook, 2012).  This has been suggested as a potentially 
productive role for the state in supporting voluntary action (Segerson & Wu, 
2006).  In this context, the incentive for protecting the resource effectively reflects 
the increasing risk of costly regulation experienced by individual firms.  This 
introduces the salience condition, effectively turning the non-point source 
pollution problem into a common pool resource problem.  Non-point source 
pollution framed as a commons problem in this way is likely to be subject to 
many of the limitations of common pool resource management found through 
field research (Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor-Tomás, 2010).  
 
For a common pool resource, even though an individual’s extraction of the 
resource impacts on that of others, it is difficult to exclude users. That is, the 
resource is rival but not excludable.  This explains some of the difficulty in 
managing common pool resources effectively, when examining the nature of the 
property rights associated with this resource.  For private goods (individual 
property), the ability of one user to exclude another’s use provides the potential 
 13 
for the overall level of use to be managed, provided there is some means of 
securing private property against theft.  Club goods are excludable, but not rival.  
This means that artificial scarcity may be created, but there are not significant 
implications for the degradation of a resource in the absence of the club.  For 
public goods, one individual’s extraction has no impact on others, but due to the 
lack of excludability, under-provision is common if payment for the public good 
cannot be effectively coordinated. Common pool resources present a similar 
challenge to public goods, in that coordination is required to reach a socially-
optimal outcome.  Instead of under-provision as in the public good case, the 
concern is over-extraction of a common pool resource by an individual impacting 
negatively on other users (and indeed, potentially creating negative externalities if 
the resource has multiple environmental services).  Common pool resource and 
public goods have unique problems due to the lack of excludability.  The 
characteristics of these different types of goods are outline in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Excludability and rivalry for different types of property 
Property type Excludable Rival 
Private goods Yes Yes 
Common pool resources No Yes 
Public goods No No 
Club goods Yes No 
 
The potential problems associated with unmanaged common pool resources were 
initially highlighted by Gordon (1954) and later Hardin (1968) in his seminal 
work, The Tragedy of the Commons.  Gordon and Hardin independently argued 
that CPR users are inevitability driven to over-exploit the resource (Gordon, 1954; 
Hardin, 1968).  However, the central thesis of their theoretical analyses is now 
generally accepted to be incorrect due to analysis of successful collective 
management of common property in the field (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & 
Acheson, 1990).  The problem so richly described in these works is perhaps more 
accurately referred to as the tragedy of open access, where common pool 
resources are not managed by any particular institutional framework.  
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Communities of resource users have frequently devised group management 
approaches throughout history.  Indeed, Hardin himself used the example of a 
common pasture being over-exploited by individual graziers, which was an 
example of successful management in reality.  Historically, common pastures 
were governed by communities of graziers with clear rules in relation to the 
number of cattle that were allowed to be grazed by any individual (Feeny, Berkes, 
McCay, & Acheson, 1990).   
 
As Hardin contended that common pool resources represented a problem of 
property rights, his conclusion called for privatisation or nationalisation in order 
to control access.  Research into community resource management institutions has 
presented a far more nuanced view (Cudney-Bueno & Basurto, 2009).  There are 
numerous examples globally of the management of common pool resources using 
institutional solutions based on community organisation and collective 
management, rather than property rights (Burger & Gochfeld, 1998).  The group 
property arrangement completes the potential management approaches outlined in 
table 2 below.  In some cases, common property approaches may be more 
effective than nationalisation or privatisation in avoiding over-extraction (Adger 
& Luttrell, 2000; Ostrom, 2006), but the relationship between communities, 
markets and states is complex and evolving (Bowles & Gintis, 2002b).  
Accordingly, a rich body of research continues to emerge around effective CPR 
management, community governance and institutions. 
 
Table 2: Property rights regimes in relation to resource management 
Property Rights Characteristics 
Open access Absence of enforced property rights 
Group property Resource rights held by a group of users who can exclude others 
Individual property Resource rights held by individuals (or firms) who can exclude 
others 
Government property Resource rights held by a Government that can regulate or 
subsidise use 
 
(Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 1999) 
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Theoretical analyses of the problem of public goods arose around the same time 
as the theoretical assessments of the common-pool resource problem (Ledyard & 
Roberts, 1974; Samuelson, 1954).  Public goods differ markedly from CPR due to 
the lack of rivalry, as one person’s benefit from a public good does not impact on 
those experienced by another.  However, there are similarities in terms of the 
social nature of the problem.  At their heart, both common pool resources and 
public goods present society with a tension between what is best for an individual, 
and what is best for society as a whole.  Both are social dilemmas that create a 
risk of selfish individuals free-riding on the positive contributions of others.  In 
experiments simulating these economic environments, some similar patterns of 
behaviour emerge.  Accordingly, while the specific focus of this study is a 
common-pool resource, analysed through experimentation, there are also 
important lessons from the literature on public goods experiments which are 
considered in this review. 
 
2.2 Experimental economics and environmental policy 
 
Much public policy of the last century has been built on neo-classical models of 
rational self-interested actors.  This policy approach dates back to the writings of 
David Hume, who considered that if policy were written for “knaves”, regulators 
would at least do no harm (Le Grand, 1997).  This position stems from a 
fundamental theoretical debate, as to whether humans are en-masse, 
fundamentally altruistic (concerned for the welfare of others) or free-riding 
(concerned only with their own welfare).  This question is relevant to policy in the 
identification of the conditions necessary for commons to be protected, or for 
public goods to be provided.  Hume’s conjecture was that public policy that 
treated all citizens as potentially free-riding would be best, and at worst do no 
harm (Hume, 1875).   
 
More recent research has shown this assumption to be incorrect.  In Covenants 
with and without a sword, Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) challenged the 
fundamental assumptions behind the Hobbsian view that sovereigns must be 
created in order to control subjects and administer sanctions.  Their experiments 
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found that the highest welfare was generated through internal covenants with 
freely-chosen sanctioning institutions.  Even more illuminatingly, covenants with 
no sanctions were found to be more effective than sanctions without covenants.  
 
The treatment of diverse people as self-interested, as suggested by Hume, can 
undermine intrinsic motivations.  In some cases, policy based on the neoclassical 
model of self-interested actors can even cause civic-minded individuals to behave 
selfishly (Bowles, 2008).  Policy based on the assumption of free-riding often 
utilises formal fines, sanctions or incentives.  In practice, there is no single rule 
for how fines or incentives will affect intrinsic motivations, such as altruism or 
ethical norms.  Policies based on formal sanctions or incentives may conflict with 
or complement intrinsic motivations, depending on how they are implemented 
(Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012).  Policies designed with behavioural nuances 
and heterogeneity in mind can avoid adverse reactions to incentives and induce 
higher levels of efficiency.  It is thus critically important to understand when 
incentives (in the neoclassical sense) do and do not work (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-
Biel, 2011). 
 
One of the most common methods employed by a society to induce more 
cooperative behaviour is the use of sanctions against those who fail to comply 
with a social norm (an informal understanding governing social behaviour).  
Formal sanctions tend to be more tangible (such as fines or incarceration).  
Informal sanctions may be as simple as the expression of disapproval.  Formal and 
informal sanctions may operate as complements or substitutes, depending on the 
arrangement.  Blau (1964) theorised that legitimate power structures develop as an 
institutionalised means of upholding social norms.  However, formalised 
institutions also react with and affect social norms.  In some cases, a law may 
crowd out an existing social norm, substituting state control for a less formal 
institution and reducing efficiency (Bohnet, Frey, & Huck, 2001; Coleman, 1993; 
Fehr & Gächter, 2001; Frey, 1997).  Alternatively, formal sanctions may correct 
inefficient social norms (Posner, 1996).  In other cases, laws or contracts may 
provide signalling that supports a social norm and vice-versa, resulting in higher 
net social benefits due to the low administration burden.  In these environments, 
formal and informal sanctions in relation to norms act as complements (Kube & 
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Traxler, 2011; Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2004; Noussair & Tucker, 2005; 
Posner, 1997).  These interactions of norms, laws and sanctions (both formal and 
informal) are of critical interest to policy-makers, as there are profound 
implications for the costs of implementation, monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Sustaining cooperation is critical to many facets of governance in human society, 
including the management of natural resources.  Common pool resources in 
particular require high levels of cooperation in order to define appropriation and 
provision rules, to ensure common property is not over-exploited.  Many of the 
most promising insights have been provided through experimental studies.  
Institutional structures and incentives are now being systematically tested for their 
potential for sustaining cooperation in providing public goods and managing 
common pool resources.  Economic experiments have the advantage of providing 
significant control over the conditions likely to affect behaviour, supporting 
designs which can begin to tease apart the complex interactions of factors that 
affect decision-making.  Good experiments enable different incentive 
environments to be tested, to see whether participants behave in a manner 
consistent with economic theory or whether there are other forces in play.  The 
findings from such experiments provide useful behavioural insights into how 
policies may need to be adapted in order to be effective or efficient in the field 
(Ostrom, 2006; Vossler, Poe, Schulze, & Segerson, 2006). 
 
The choices made by participants in social dilemma games are typically described 
in relation to two different strategic equilibria, the Nash equilibrium and the social 
(Pareto) optimum.  These two arrangements represent a non-cooperative and a 
cooperative equilibrium, respectively. The Nash equilibrium occurs where all 
participants seek to maximise their own returns, in the absence of any knowledge 
about others’ strategies (Nash, 1951).  This is comparable to what might be 
expected under neo-classical economic theory.  Each individual assumes that all 
other individuals are similarly seeking to maximise their individual welfare, rather 
than the interests of the group as a whole.  
 
The social optimum occurs where all participants seek to maximise the total 
returns to the group, and assume that all other participants are trying to do the 
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same.  This produces a solution to the game which is Pareto-optimal and 
maximises total welfare.  In the neo-classical model, it would be expected that 
some form of intervention would be required in order to achieve such a social 
optimum.  Early in the experimental fields of sociology, psychology, political 
science and economics, free-riding was found to be less common than expected 
and explanations in terms of “rational” actors elusive.  Instead, a diverse range of 
behaviours and strategies were uncovered, ranging in between these two extreme 
equilibria (Bohm, 1972; Isaac, Walker, & Thomas, 1984; Marwell & Ames, 1979; 
van de Kragt, Dawes, & Orbell, 1988).   
 
In one-shot experiments that do not feature institutional controls, cooperation 
usually occurs at a level higher than the self-interested Nash equilibrium, but less 
than the social optimum, with contributions to a public good typically at 40 to 60 
per cent of the initial endowment.  This was a key finding of early public goods 
experiments (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Marwell & Ames, 1979, 1981) 
but was found to be unstable in repeated one-shot games.  With repetition of a 
game, while contributions generally begin at a similar level between the social 
optimum and Nash equilibrium, they tend to decline over time towards the Nash 
equilibrium (Andreoni, 1988; Isaac, McCue, & Plott, 1985; Isaac & Walker, 
1988b).   
 
A number of factors influencing the level of cooperation over time have been 
demonstrated through systematic experimentation.  One of the early factors found 
to improve the rate of contributions is communication (Dawes et al., 1977; Isaac 
& Walker, 1988a; Ostrom et al., 1992), which is discussed further below.  More 
recently, two major advances have been made – the existence of “conditional co-
operators” and the role of costly punishment (Chaudhuri, 2011).   
 
While some participants follow self-interested strategies, others behave randomly 
or altruistically.  The largest group, however, tends to be conditional co-operators, 
who choose their strategies based on expectations and evidence of others’ 
behaviour (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001).  Whether exploitative or 
fairness-minded behaviour dominates is dependent on the economic environment 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).  Conditional co-operators tend to contribute according to 
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others’ behaviour.  If they find that they have contributed less than the group 
average, they contribute more in the next round.  If they find that they have 
contributed more than the group average, they will tend to contribute less (Bowles 
& Gintis, 2002a; Fischbacher et al., 2001).  The commonly-observed decline in 
contributions over time can be explained by the fact that conditional co-operators 
tend to have a bias towards contributing slightly less than the average.  This 
means that most participants will follow the declining average downward over 
time (Fischbacher et al., 2001).  This makes sustaining cooperation very unlikely 
in unregulated institutions.   
 
Experimental work has led to the description of participants in experiments in a 
number of different ways, according to their general behaviour in response to a 
given economic environment. This provides a more complete description of likely 
behavioural responses to a given policy scenario or decision-making environment.  
For example, a five-agent model used by Carpenter involved unconditional co-
operators (altruists), unconditional free-riders (knaves), general tit-for-taters 
(conditional co-operators), nice punishers (unconditional co-operators that also 
punish free-riders) and mean punishers (essentially hypocrites that both free-ride 
and punish).  The model essentially captures the three different cooperation 
preferences, as well as attitudes towards the use of sanctions (Carpenter, 2007b). 
 
2.3 Social dilemma game environments 
 
There are many experimental games used to measure social preferences (for 
example, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Ultimatum game or the Dictator 
game).  The class of games most pertinent to this research (and thus the 
predominant focus of this literature review) is broadly referred to as public goods 
games, though this also includes common pool resource games (Ledyard, 1997).  
These games involve multiple (usually four or more) players faced with a social 
dilemma, where the interests of individuals diverge from the social optimum.  
Participants must cooperate in order to gain the maximum social benefit.   
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While some experimental findings are relatively consistent, other findings vary 
markedly across the different types of games, such as those associated with the 
overall level of cooperation, the degree of efficiency and the effectiveness of 
sanctions (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015).  This variation highlights the importance 
of considering the experimental context, incentives and institutional structure 
when interpreting experimental results.  While sharing a divergence between 
individual incentives and the promotion of welfare maximisation, there are critical 
differences in the construction of payoff functions, rivalry and institutions that 
have consequential impacts on the incentive structures within each game.  This 
means that while some findings are common, we cannot generalise between the 
different types of game.  There are four key types of public goods games of 
relevance to this research.  A brief description of key experimental settings 
follows. 
 
Linear Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) 
The linear VCM is perhaps the most frequently-used of all public goods games.  
The linear VCM operates by assigning all members of a group an initial 
endowment of tokens (E).  Participants can then choose to contribute some or all 
of their tokens (g) to a public account, in order to generate a given rate of return 
(β).  Tokens retained in the participant’s private account receive the rate of return 
(α).  All participants then receive equal shares of the public account revenue.  An 
individual’s payoff (𝜋𝑖) can thus be calculated by equation 1. 
 
 
𝝅𝒊 = 𝜶(𝑬𝒊 − 𝒈𝒊) + 𝜷 ∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
 (1) 
 
This equation is typically parameterised so that β < α, which makes the 
neoclassical self-interested (Nash) strategy for an individual to be retention of all 
their tokens.  Participants that retain all their tokens can still get a return from the 
group account by free-riding on the contributions of others.  In addition, the game 
is typically parameterised so that α < nβ (where n denotes number of participants), 
which makes the social optimum involve all participants contributing all of their 
tokens.  The Nash and social optimum strategies are thus at opposite, extreme 
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ends of the decision space (g).  This presents a simple stylised version of the 
public goods problem.  The whole group benefits from the provision of the public 
good.  However, as no individual can be excluded from those benefits, there is no 
self-interested incentive to pay for it.  This is true of typical public goods, such as 
defence.   
 
Non-Linear VCM 
The non-linear VCM is very similar to the linear VCM, except that additional 
complexity is introduced by varying the payoff parameters α and β so that the 
marginal per-capita group return decreases relative to the individual return as 
contributions increase.  The result is a much more difficult game, where the Nash 
equilibrium and social optimum may be in the interior of the decision space (g) 
rather than at the level of maximum or minimum contributions.  This is similar in 
terms of the social dilemma that is described by the linear VCM, in that 
individuals are not incentivised to contribute a sufficient amount to the public 
good to reach the social optimum level.  The variation that makes for the interior 
Nash equilibrium and social optimum makes it more realistic.  Continuing with 
the example of defence, it is unlikely that an individual would wish to pay nothing 
and be entirely unprotected, but it is equally unlikely that contributing the 
maximum possible amount to defence would be worthwhile.  Above a certain 
level of defence, additional spending would return only minimal gains, which 
would not be worthwhile for society.  In the field, many public goods are subject 
to diminishing marginal returns in this way. 
 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) Game 
CPR games are an even more complex non-linear game, designed to emulate a 
renewable resource management environment, with a maximum sustainable yield.  
The explanation of the experimental arrangement differs slightly in that each 
token “invested” in the public account corresponds to a level of extraction from a 
common pool resource (for example, a forest or fishery).  Participants may choose 
to place tokens in a private or public account.  For the example of a forest, the 
public account represents effort spent harvesting wood, while the private account 
represents effort on the next best alternative.  The return to the group increases 
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with greater harvesting of the forest up to a point of maximum sustainable yield.  
If too much harvesting occurs (i.e. too many tokens are placed in the group 
account), the group returns become worse, as not enough new trees are maturing 
to replace the ones that have been harvested.  Importantly, returns to each 
individual depend on how much effort they expend, rather than an equal share.  
While the social optimum is to only harvest the maximum sustainable yield, each 
individual can improve their own returns by harvesting more than their share of 
wood, even if this means degrading the resource.  This sets up the twin problems 
of non-excludability and rivalry that define common pool resource problems in 
the field. 
 
The following description takes the form used by Ostrom, Walker and Gardner in 
their seminal paper Covenants with and without a Sword (1992).  For ease of 
comparison, the same labels are used as for the VCM description above.  
Participants can choose to invest some or all of their tokens (g) from their initial 
endowment (E).  Group payoffs are determined by a concave function (F).  This 
function is parameterised so that F(0)=0, F’(0)>α, and F’(nE)<0.  This means that 
both the Pareto optimum and Nash equilibrium are internal to the extraction 
choice space (g).  The Pareto optimum occurs at slightly less than the maximum 
productivity of the CPR.  The Nash equilibrium results in over-exploitation, but 
not exhaustion of the CPR. 
 
 
𝝅𝒊 = 𝜶(𝑬𝒊 − 𝒈𝒊) +
𝒈𝒊
∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
𝑭 ∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
 (2) 
 
Importantly, in this structure individual payoffs from the group account are earned 
according to the level of appropriation (determined by 𝑔𝑖/ ∑ 𝑔𝑖) rather than a pre-
determined share (1/n) as in VCM games.  This introduces rivalry to the game, so 
that when one participant increases their own contribution, their appropriation 
gains them much higher benefits, while decreasing the earnings of others. 
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Pollution games and ambient schemes 
Pollution games and ambient schemes are similar to CPR games, in that they tend 
to have interior Nash and Pareto solutions.  Payoffs in relation to use of the CPR 
are also associated with a negative impact driven by the sum of group 
contributions.  The differences are primarily driven by parameterisation and 
framing.  These pollution games were structured to test experimentally the 
theoretical work of Segerson and others on “ambient schemes” for pollution 
control. 
 
A typical formulation of this game is used by Cason and Gangadharan (2013), 
with payoffs and costs structured similarly to Spraggon (2002).  Individual 
payoffs are expressed according to a concave function, so that the benefits (B) for 
a given level of emissions (E) are expressed as shown in equation 3. 
 
 𝑩(𝑬𝒊) = 𝟒𝟒 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐(𝟏𝟐𝟓 − 𝑬𝒊)
𝟐 (3) 
 
In this example, maximum benefits of 44 are achieved at an emissions level of 
125.  The concavity of the function reflects the fact that above a certain level, 
excessive use of inputs causes decreased benefits, reflecting declining marginal 
returns for the individual.  Participants choose a given level of emissions and 
receive the associated level of benefit. 
 
Environmental damages (ED) are expressed by way of a damage function.  Each 
participant experiences an equal (1/n) share of the cost of these damages, 
calibrated by a transmission coefficient (t). Thus, the return to each individual is 
expressed as 𝜋𝑖 = 𝐵(𝐸𝑖) − 𝐸𝐷, where 𝐵(𝐸𝑖) is defined in equation (3) and ED is 
defined in equation 4 below.  
 
 
𝑬𝑫 =
𝟏
𝒏
[∑ 𝒕𝑬𝒋
𝒏𝒋
𝒋=𝟏
] (4) 
 
There are two main ways in which users might experience damage costs in the 
field.  The first is if they are imposed exogenously on all members of the 
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population.  For example, a regulator might impose a tax on the diffuse emissions 
of nutrients that are measured in a water body, as suggested in ambient scheme 
institutions (such as Spraggon, (2002) for example).  The second formulation is to 
assume that damages are experienced endogenously (i.e. by the producers 
themselves).  The example used by Cason and Gangadharan is that of pesticide 
leaching, which might pollute the drinking water supplies of individual farmers 
(Cason & Gangadharan, 2013).   
 
Imposing this damage function makes the incentive environment for pollution 
games very similar to that of a common-pool resource.  Since each unit of 
production for an individual adds to the damage function experienced by the 
group, subjects are able to externalise most of the damage they cause while 
earning significant benefits for themselves, making the game rival.  Though the 
public and private benefit (or damage) functions are different to those in CPR 
games, individuals experience a similar concave total benefit function, with their 
benefits being rival with other participants in the game.   
 
2.4 Incentives – group size, marginal per-capita return and rivalry 
 
The design of incentive environments has a strong impact on the overall level of 
cooperation within a game.  Accordingly, incentives must be included in 
consideration of how other institutional factors, such as sanctions, affect 
behaviour.  This is true within the same type of game (for example, where payoff 
functions or marginal per capital return may vary) and across different games 
(such as the rival and non-rival designs of CPR and VCM games, respectively).  
 
Early in the development of public goods theory generally, the size of groups 
involved in social dilemmas was theorised to be of critical influence on whether 
or not cooperation is likely to occur.  Olson’s (1965) seminal work on collective 
action paid particular attention to how in large groups, the incentives for the 
provision of public goods decline, as each individual would gain a smaller and 
smaller share of the benefits as group size increased.  However, this conception of 
the group size effect is inherently intertwined with the issue of incentives.  
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Marwell and Ames (1979) showed early on that there was little effect from group 
size itself, but a strong effect from the marginal per capita return (MPCR).  Unless 
experiments are designed in such a way as to alter the MPCR in concert with 
group size, the observed group size effect is due to the changing MPCR.  The 
exception to this is that in the field and in experiments where mutual monitoring is 
required, group size is likely to have effects on the effectiveness of monitoring 
and enforcement (Carpenter, 2007b).  The effectiveness of monitoring is also 
covered extensively in the field literature on CPRs.  For example, both the work 
of Ostrom (1994) on design principles for common pool resource governance and 
subsequent reviews such as Cox, Arnold and Villamayor-Tomás (2010) 
emphasise the importance of effective monitoring for effective governance. 
 
Isaac and Walker (1988b) and Isaac et al. (1984) both investigated changes to the 
MPCR in terms of its effect on cooperation.  This work identified that a higher 
MPCR was found to increase the rate of cooperation, independent of group size.  
Increasing the MPCR changes the incentive environment by increasing the 
benefits of cooperation, relative to free-riding.  Interestingly, while less free-
riding was found to occur in these experiments than would be predicted by the 
classical model, participants still responded clearly to incentives.  While a 
significant amount of work on marginal incentives has been undertaken in linear 
VCM games, there has been little systematic examination of the effect of 
incentives across different game environments.  Cason and Gangadharan (2015) 
undertook some recent work in peer punishment comparing the linear VCM, non-
linear VCM and CPR environments while holding total payoffs constant, but this 
work did not take into account the significantly different marginal incentives to 
defect created by the rival and nature of the CPR game. 
 
A third critical impact on the incentive environment in social dilemma games is 
whether there is the presence of rivalry.  Rivalry has long been theorised as a 
critical difference between public goods and common pool resources (Musgrave, 
1959).  However, it has not always been recognised as such in the experimental 
literature (for example, Ledyard, (1997)).  In fact the difference is marked.  In the 
context of a public good such as defence, one person’s benefit from the good does 
not impact on another’s.  However, for a common-pool resource like a forest, 
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once wood has been harvested, it is no longer available for others to use.  VCM 
games assign benefits from the group account to each participant based on a pre-
determined formula, so that all participants’ gains are dependent only on the total 
level of the good provided, rather than their own individual contributions.  For 
CPR games, however, benefits from the public account are assigned according to 
the level of participants’ contributions.  Systematic investigation of this difference 
was undertaken by Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006) in experiments featuring 
identical payoffs and social optima.  This study identified significant differences 
in the distributions of how participants respond to the two different rival and non-
rival environments, though the general pattern of beginning close to the social 
optimum and declining towards Nash equilibrium was still present. 
 
2.5 Sanctions 
 
The use of sanctions in sustaining cooperation is central to the aim of this study.  
Fundamentally, we are attempting to determine whether strong incentives for free-
riding can be overcome by strong sanctions.  The use of sanctioning institutions to 
improve provision of public goods in experiments is extensive and has been 
known for some time (Yamagishi (1986) for example).  Sanctions may be 
administered by group members to each other (peer punishment), or by an 
external sanctioning institution (simulating a government intervention).  
Punishment may be formal (such as monetary fines), or informal (such as social 
disapproval).  Formal and informal sanctions can work independently or in 
concert to enhance welfare (Dugar, 2013; Noussair & Tucker, 2005).  There are 
two ways in which sanctions can enhance cooperation.  Directly, sanctions can 
change the payoffs of cooperation or defection in such a way as to make 
cooperation preferable even to free-riders.  Indirectly, sanctions promote 
cooperation among conditional co-operators by ensuring that they are not 
discouraged by free-riders (Shinada & Yamagishi, 2007).   
 
Peer punishment is perhaps the most studied of sanctioning mechanisms, 
particularly in recent years.  Typically, when peer punishment is employed within 
a given experimental setting, participants are able to pay a small fee and 
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consequently lower the earnings of others by a larger amount.  This may be 
unconstrained (where any participant can punish any other, regardless of their 
choice of cooperation or defection) or subject to constraints (for example, through 
restricting punishment to fining defectors only) (Casari, 2005).  This type of 
arrangement reflects more informal community-based governance approaches in 
the field, recognising that sanctioning another member of a group is never without 
cost, whether this cost is borne in terms of time, effort or social capital (Casari & 
Plott, 2003).  Alternatively, experiments with some kind of centralised 
sanctioning institution typically involve standardising the punishment of 
individuals according to a set of rules, sometimes with rules designed by 
participants themselves.  This bears closer resemblance to the delegation of 
enforcement to state power and the creation of a Leviathan (i.e. a large central 
body that is in charge of regulation).  Peer punishment is common in VCM and 
CPR game settings, while state punishment has dominated pollution game settings 
– though both approaches have been used in all game environments to some 
extent.  The reason for this apparent partitioning may be that the VCM and CPR 
game literature is primarily focused on group dynamics and behaviour in 
mitigating the social dilemma, while pollution game literature has been more 
focused on the overall effectiveness of the institution in achieving an 
environmental outcome in circumstances where the state cannot observe the 
behaviour of individual firms.   
 
Many explanations have been advanced for people’s demand for the use of peer 
punishment.  Some experiments suggest that (at least in laboratory settings) while 
strategic motivations drive the allocation of rewards, more intrinsic motivations 
drive punishment (Choi & Ahn, 2013).  Notably, the use of punishment is 
common even at the end of a game when there is no subsequent benefit, indicating 
that participants enjoy punishing other participants for reasons other than merely 
influencing the actions of others in a game (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010).  Other 
possible explanations include inequality-aversion, emotions, reciprocity, 
confusion, spite and social norms.  These motivations are difficult to discern and 
while theories have been advanced, this remains an open empirical question 
(Casari, 2005; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005). 
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Peer punishment has been particularly studied in recent years in linear VCM 
games, especially in relation to its capacity to improve cooperation
1
.  Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) generated significant interest with their findings in relation to 
costly punishment, triggering a wave of research under similar designs and 
punishment technologies.  Their key findings were:  
1. That there is significant willingness of co-operators to punish free-riders. 
2. That this holds true even when punishment is costly to the punisher. 
3. That free riders are punished more heavily, the more they deviate from the 
contributions of co-operators.  
 
This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “altruistic punishment”, due to the 
fact that punishers are not expected to gain any benefits from the money they 
spend on costly punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  Because of this cost, 
punishment is itself a public good.  The use of punishment increases pro-social 
behaviour, and is therefore welfare enhancing. However, this welfare 
enhancement is non-rival (since all group members benefit from the punishment 
of free riders) and non-excludable (since there is no means to limit these benefits 
to the punisher alone).  The use of costly punishment by Fehr and Gächter (2002) 
increased players’ contributions significantly and prevented the typical decline in 
contributions observed over time in experiments without punishment.  
Significantly, this pattern occurred even with designs based around strangers and 
with no communication.   
 
Falk et al. (2005) undertook subsequent work examining the motivations behind 
the use of costly punishment.  Interestingly, while most punishment undertaken by 
co-operators was targeted towards defectors, defectors also undertook a 
significant amount of punishment towards co-operators.  By manipulating the 
degree to which participants could affect the difference between each other’s 
payoffs, the authors were also able to determine that punishment was largely 
driven by the desire to punish wrongdoing than by a desire to equalise benefits 
(Falk et al., 2005).   
 
                                                 
1
 For a survey, see Chaudhuri (2011). 
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Experimental studies giving participants the option of joining sanctioning or non-
sanctioning institutions have demonstrated that most participants prefer to have 
some form of recourse to punish free-riders.  Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach 
(2006) provided an illustrative example of the advantage of sanctions.  In an 
experiment giving participants the choice of whether to join a sanctioning or non-
sanctioning institution, over time the non-sanctioning institution became 
completely depopulated due to the competitive advantage created by sanctions 
(Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006).  Whether sanctions improve 
efficiency (and enhance overall welfare compared to not having punishment, after 
the costs of punishment are accounted for) is not straightforward.  The impact of 
punishment on efficiency depends on the incentive environment and the cost of 
punishment, as well as the time horizon (Chaudhuri 2011).   
 
Gächter, Renner and Sefton (2008) have comprehensively shown sanctioning 
institutions to be more efficient in linear VCM games, given a large enough 
number of periods.  Over time, participants learn to centre contributions around 
norms which do not attract punishment, which makes punishment less necessary.  
While contributions remain high, less punishment is needed in later rounds of the 
game.  The initial costs of punishment in establishing the norm become 
insignificant as earnings continue to be high in subsequent periods with little or no 
punishment (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008).  Combining informal sanctions 
with peer punishment has also been shown to enhance welfare.  As informal 
sanctions support greater cooperation without associated costs, the combination of 
both formal and informal sanctions results in higher efficiency than games 
featuring only formal fines (Dugar, 2013; Noussair & Tucker, 2005).   
 
Though much of this recent work has been undertaken in VCM public goods 
experiments, there is a parallel history of investigation into punishment in CPR 
experiments, though the examples are much less frequent. This is surprising, 
given that peer punishment is frequently found in the field as part of institutions 
that have been successful in sustaining common-pool resources (Cox, Arnold, & 
Villamayor-Tomás, 2010; Wilson, Ostrom, & Cox, 2013).  Many studies of 
diverse resource user groups around the world have found sanctions to be a key 
part of sustaining cooperation over time in successful institutions (Gibson, 
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Williams, & Ostrom, 2005).  Ostrom, Walker and Gardner’s (1992) seminal work 
in resource management institutions examined the role of peer punishment, 
alongside less formal covenant arrangements, using CPR games.  Interestingly, 
this study reached the opposite conclusion to that of Fehr and Gächter (2000).  
Namely, that in the absence of communication, peer punishment did not improve 
welfare and in some cases, was even worse than unregulated games (Ostrom, 
Walker, & Gardner, 1992).  The potential causes of these divergent findings have 
received little attention until recent years.  Kingsley (2015) tackled the issue of the 
different incentives to defect by testing peer punishment in two environments (a 
public goods game and a CPR game) with identical payoff curves, Nash equilibria 
and social optima.  The effectiveness of peer punishment in the two environments 
was, in fact, very similar.  This suggests it is entirely possible that responsiveness 
to incentives or punishment is identical across the different environments, but that 
that the welfare-enhancing results of Fehr and Gächter (2000) are possible only in 
the simple VCM environment. 
 
Sanctions have also been studied extensively in pollution games, usually through 
the use of centralised formal sanctioning institutions, though a few examples of 
peer punishment have been investigated (Cason & Gangadharan, 2013).  Though 
the experiments have a very similar incentive environment to common-pool 
resource games, the literature is worth examining in some detail due to the careful 
consideration and definition of the non-point source pollution problem that has 
been developed and the accompanying application of sanctioning mechanisms. 
 
Considerable attention has been paid in the experimental literature on non-point 
source pollution to so-called “ambient schemes”.  Ambient schemes were devised 
as a theoretical response to the problems of uncertainty and unobservability 
associated with NPS pollution.  Segerson (1988) designed one of the first such 
systems as a means to apply environmental taxes where emissions are stochastic 
and not directly observable, building on the work of Holmstrom (1982) in the 
moral hazard literature, as related to labour economics (Holmstrom, 1982; 
Hölmstrom, 1979; K. Segerson, 1988).  Segerson’s ambient schemes attempted to 
resolve the stochasticity problem by applying taxes and rebates based on the 
amount of a pollutant observed in the environment (for example, sediment in a 
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river) following the logic that polluters would adjust their mitigation behaviour so 
that the probability distribution for emissions shifted towards the desired 
equilibrium outcome.  The observability problem was intended to be resolved by 
applying taxes to all possible polluters at the same rate, equal to the marginal 
abatement cost (i.e. if marginal damages are estimated at $100, all polluters face a 
tax of $100 each for a breach of an environmental limit).  Similar instruments 
were developed on a theoretical basis in order to address various shortcomings in 
relation to the incentive structures and information demands of the institutions 
described by Segerson (Cabe & Herriges, 1992; Hansen, 1998; Horan, Shortle, & 
Abler, 1998, 2002; Karp, 2005).  Xepapadeas (1995) extended these instruments 
to involve polluting firms that could volunteer more accurate information in 
exchange for a lower tax rate, thus transforming the ambient taxes into dynamic 
Pigouvian taxes.  
 
The first experimental work testing these institutions was undertaken by Spraggon 
(2002).  Spraggon (2002) found Segerson’s institutions to successfully mitigate 
the moral hazard problem regardless of uncertainty and experience, through the 
use of centralised punishment.  However, he recognised that as none of the 
instruments ensure individual compliance, equity concerns were likely to be 
raised as members of the group that cooperate are penalised for the behaviour of 
free-riders (Spraggon, 2002).  The work of Spraggon (2002) has since been 
extended to include cases where polluters might cooperate in order to game the 
subsidy system (Millock & Salanie, 2005; Poe, Schulze, Segerson, Suter, & 
Vossler, 2004; Suter et al., 2008) and to compare the relative efficiency of 
mechanisms including marginal taxes and subsidies, ﬁxed penalty mechanisms, 
and combined ﬁxed penalty and tax/subsidy mechanisms (Cochard, Willinger, & 
Xepapadeas, 2005; Francisco, Requate, & Schram, 2004; Suter et al., 2008).  In 
each case, incremental changes have been suggested to improve theoretical 
shortcomings.   
 
However, there are more fundamental practical problems associated with ambient 
schemes which are not addressed.  Though a few examples exist, little is known 
about their actual effectiveness.  There remains a need to evaluate such policies as 
it seems the theoretical and experimental settings simply do not reflect the reality 
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of the problem.  Ambient schemes would likely work best under four conditions: 
(1) a small number of polluters; (2) relatively homogeneous firms; (3) readily 
monitored water quality; and (4) short time lags between emissions and their 
contribution to ambient pollution levels (Poe et al., 2004).  In reality, these 
conditions are unlikely to be satisfied.  In relation to needing a small number of 
polluters, many catchments are likely to be far too large to satisfy this condition.  
While a regulator may theoretically divide a large catchment into more 
manageable units, this is likely to be constrained by the ability to attribute water 
quality for each management unit to the appropriate group of firms.  In relation to 
needing relatively homogeneous firms, the heterogeneity of farms and farmers is 
well-documented, with important implications for the cost-effectiveness of a 
given environmental policy (Doole & Pannell, 2012).  While monitoring ambient 
water quality at sufficient resolution is technically possible, at present water 
quality modelling is constrained by cost and capacity (NIWA 2014).  The 
requirement for short time lags is perhaps most problematic of all.  In the case of 
sediment inputs to water bodies, there may be a relatively short lag between 
runoff and appearance in a water body (especially during high-rainfall events).  
However, the agricultural practices that led to the emission event are not 
necessarily undertaken recently, as it is more likely that farm management 
practices are designed to spread risk in anticipation of stochastic climate variation 
(Romstad, 2003).  In the case of dissolved phosphorus runoff, time lags are likely 
to be too long to enable an ambient scheme to operate effectively.  For nitrogen 
emissions, the transmission via groundwater to a surface water body may take 
place on the scale of decades or more (Meals, Dressing, & Davenport, 2010).  
This gives current ambient concentrations of pollutants, at best, a weak 
relationship to current land use practices.  This suggests that a centralised 
punishment institution based on a group tax, as used in ambient scheme 
experiments, is not particularly realistic compared to peer punishment, where 
users may more readily monitor each other. 
 
More recently, Cason and Gangadharan (2013) tested both an ambient tax and 
peer punishment in isolation and in combination.  Results showed that although 
formal group tax mechanisms (as in ambient schemes) were more effective than 
informal peer punishment, the most effective approach for achieving a desired 
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environmental outcome was to use a combination of both.  This research echoes 
earlier findings on the combination of formal and informal sanctions in VCM 
games.  More recently, group tax and peer punishment mechanisms have been 
tested using heterogeneous firms.  These experiments are beginning to tease out 
important factors which would significantly hinder the implementation of any 
such schemes in real policy.  For example, as soon as heterogeneity is introduced 
to the game, the allocation of rights and questions of equity begin to hamper 
overall levels of efficiency and cooperation.  Attempting to implement policies for 
heterogeneous actors without first resolving these questions is likely to prove 
difficult (Cason & Gangadharan, 2013; Reuben & Riedl, 2013; Suter, Vossler, & 
Poe, 2009). 
 
2.7 The cost of sanctions  
 
Within public goods games, the cost of peer punishment is typically expressed as 
a fee-to-fine or punishment effectiveness ratio (i.e. how many units of punishment 
are meted out for one unit of cost to the punisher).  The imposition of this cost in 
experiments is generally used to reflect the fact that in the field, the punishment of 
others is likely to carry costs (whether in money, time, effort, social capital or 
some other monetary or social cost).  The term punishment effectiveness ratio is 
used in this study, though in practice this is the same as cost, since the ratio 
reflects the sanction associated with a given cost.  There are several effects that 
variation in this ratio has on the use of punishment, which have knock-on effects 
for levels of cooperation in a group.  The effectiveness of punishment interacts 
with the incentives to defect within a given institutional structure (Murphy, 
Rapoport, & Parco, 2006).  This is an important component to understanding how 
punishment is used across different economic environments, such as in the 
determination of differences between the VCM and CPR games. 
 
Several studies have found that the cost of punishment affects demand.  
Generally, when incentives are held constant, increasing the punishment 
effectiveness ratio increases the amount of punishment demanded by participants.  
In this way punishment is a normal good, though it is generally inelastic with 
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respect to income (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007a).  Due to this 
change in demand, the cost of punishment also has effects on the overall level of 
cooperation within a game.  Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) undertook a 
particularly useful systematic study using the cost of punishment as their main 
treatment variable in a series of linear VCM games.  With a punishment 
effectiveness ratio of 1:1 or 1:2, punishment in their VCM environment was found 
to increase contributions, but be ineffective in arresting the decline of cooperation 
over time and ineffective in increasing welfare relative to a treatment with no 
punishment.  A treatment with a punishment ratio of 1:3 was required in order to 
increase welfare and prevent the decline in contributions over time. 
 
Counter-intuitively, participants still show a demand for punishment even when it 
is not credible.  Experiments suggest that overall demand for punishment is a 
social preference, though the total amount may vary in response to price (Casari & 
Luini, 2012).  Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found that uninterested third party 
participants were willing to punish free-riders, even when this came at a cost.  
Similarly, while defection may be observed with and without sanctions, the 
degree of defection is responsive to the size of a potential sanction (Houser, Xiao, 
McCabe, & Smith, 2008).  Given the responsiveness to price, more severe 
punishment (with a higher punishment effectiveness ratio) has the potential to 
increase overall payoffs and efficiency, due to lower cost of enforcing cooperation 
and greater overall levels of cooperation (Ambrus & Greiner, 2012).   
 
Where monitoring is fully effective, increasing the severity of punishment 
increases the overall group payoffs.  However, in a more realistic environment 
that features imperfect monitoring, increasing severity of punishment has been 
found to initially decrease overall payoffs, even in the linear VCM, as costs rise 
without sufficient deterrence to increase cooperation (Ambrus & Greiner, 2012). 
Punishment behaviour in a group dynamic also responds to variations in the cost 
of punishment between individuals.  In cases where participants have 
heterogeneous costs of punishment, tacit agreements may emerge that only the 
strongest will punish free-riders, increasing overall efficiency by effectively 
centralising punishment (Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013).  Individuals will 
shoulder a higher burden of the punishment of free-riders in experiments where 
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they are given more cost-effective punishment.  Nikiforakis, Normann, and 
Wallace (2010) found that while players with higher-punishment effectiveness 
contributed similar amounts, they tended to punish more than their fellow-players 
with less-effective punishment.  This is likely to be driven by the same 
relationship between cost and demand observed between experiments with 
homogeneous costs of punishment that vary the cost across different treatments 
(Nikiforakis, Normann, & Wallace, 2010). 
 
It is possible that the tendency to pool or centralise punishment institutions within 
society is a response developed to lower the cost of punishment.  When given the 
option, the centralisation or specialisation of a punishment institution or enforcer 
can be an attractive means for reducing the cost of punishment.  In a design 
featuring the choice of nominating a “hired gun” to act as the enforcer (often 
referred to as pool-punishment), Andreoni and Gee (2012) found that participants 
would choose this option 70 per cent of the time.  This centralised arrangement 
was also found to be more economically efficient than peer punishment (Andreoni 
& Gee, 2012).  Similar results were found by Traulsen, Röhl and Milinski (2012).  
However, some subject groups in these experiments were successful using 
informal peer sanctions.  As further support for the hypothesis that centralisation 
is driven by a desire to reduce cost, the choice of punishment option was 
responsive to the cost of formal third-party punishment (Markussen, Putterman, & 
Tyran, 2014).  Zhang, Li, De Silva, Bednarik, & Sigmund (2014) found that in 
fact pool-punishment only emerges when there is punishment of individuals that 
fail to punish free-riders. 
 
The vast majority of experiments examining the cost of punishment have been 
undertaken in VCM games.  While the experiments of Ostrom et al. (1992) 
included punishment effectiveness ratios of 1:4 and 1:2, there has been little 
systematic exploration since.  CPR games typically feature higher incentives for 
free-riding, compared to VCM games.  The less frequent punishment observed in 
these experiments was found by Cason and Gangadharan (2015) to be less 
effective in sustaining cooperation (when using the same punishment ratio of 1:3 
also used in the linear VCM games).  However, experiments varying the returns in 
VCM games have found that in fact players punish more when the stakes are 
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higher (Carpenter, 2007b) which suggests that confusion or disagreement about 
norms may have a bigger role to play in the CPR games.  In order to properly 
disentangle this issue, it is necessary to answer the question as to whether a 
stronger punishment ratio can better support coordination in the CPR game.  That 
is, whether more severe punishment can be an effective mechanism in promoting 
cooperation where punishment is less frequent. 
 
Cason and Gangadharan (2015) have undertaken some experiments recently that 
suggest support for the findings of Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) in the 
CPR environment.  Cason and Gangadharan (2015) tested the impacts of peer 
punishment across three different types of game (linear VCM, non-linear VCM 
and CPR), showing differences between institutions.  One of the key changes to 
the design of Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) was to use an updated 
punishment institution, including the ability to vary the level of punishment used.  
A punishment effectiveness ratio of 1:3 was used (compared to a range of 1:2 to 
1:4 used by Ostrom et al. (1992)) and each participant could assign up to five 
punishment points to each other participant (compared to only one per participant 
in Ostrom et al. (1992)).  Findings from these experiments indicated that even 
with the updated mechanism, peer punishment was less effective in sustaining 
cooperation in the more complex non-linear VCM and CPR environments than in 
the linear VCM.  The authors have suggested that this is due to the effect of 
confusion.  However, the interaction of different incentives for defection or 
cooperation with the punishment effectiveness ratio is not explicitly considered 
(Cason & Gangadharan, 2015).  
 
2.8 Norms and complexity 
 
Norms are informal understandings or agreements about what the right thing to do 
is in a given situation.  Where there is potential for private self-interest to generate 
a negative impact on other members of a society, demand for some kind of 
governing social norm exists (Coleman, 1990).  The existence of cooperation 
among a group faced with a social dilemma is predicated on there being some 
kind of shared understanding of the right thing to do.  This is equally relevant to 
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the use of sanctions in the management of common-pool resources.  In social 
dilemma games (and indeed in many other contexts), people make decisions about 
their actions based on their expectations of the behaviour of others.  For some, this 
may mean a high contribution to the public good, potentially reflecting an 
expectation that others will do the same. For others, this may mean a small 
contribution, if the expectation is that others will free-ride (Dawes et al., 1977).  
The decisions made do not automatically reflect the preferences of the individuals 
in question; rather, the decisions reflect the expectations of individuals about the 
preferences of others.  For example, a person with strong social tendencies may 
choose to not make a large contribution to a public good, if their expectation is 
that others will simply free ride.  
 
In the absence of institutional controls, it is therefore to be expected that the base 
level of cooperation that occurs is partially a product of cultural expectations 
about cooperation and free-riding.  Cross-cultural experimental research has 
shown that institutional mechanisms designed to promote cooperation such as 
costly punishment have mixed success, depending on existing norms.  In 
particular, whether cultural norms of cooperation are already in existence has a 
strong influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of institutional arrangements. 
Some pools of participants may predominantly punish free-riding, while others 
may be relatively indiscriminate, undertaking anti-social punishment. Weak 
norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are 
significant predictors of antisocial punishment (Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 
2008). Interestingly, punishment may be more severe in cohesive groups, perhaps 
reflecting higher expectations of norm adherence.  Shinada, Yamagishi and 
Ohumura found that participants who are cooperative in a gift-giving game punish 
noncooperative in-group members more severely than they punish noncooperative 
out-group members (Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004). 
 
In the absence of a clear allocation rule under which punishment should be 
applied, considerable confusion can arise due to participants having different 
views on the social norm.  In some cases, one preference may dominate, leading 
to a sustainable state where punishment is based on a single social norm.  
However, there is no guarantee that this will happen quickly, or at all, leading to 
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protracted “feuds” between different group members a particular rule 
(Nikiforakis, Noussair, & Wilkening, 2012).  
 
Clarity about norms and expectations is critical to sustaining cooperation. Even 
when games do not feature sanctions, the ability to set expectations about the best 
action for the group as a whole through communication significantly increases 
cooperation.  The use of punishment without communication may operate in a 
similar way, in that being punished for a particular action may signal disapproval 
from other group members.  Of course, it is not always clear how expectations 
about preferences translate into actions, particularly where there is a high level of 
complexity.  For example, if one participant is expecting others to behave 
selfishly, but is unable to discern what the best strategy would be for a self-
interested person, then they will have difficulty determining what actions to 
expect.  In cases of confusion, punishment is likely to be less helpful as a 
signalling mechanism, since those that receive punishment may be no wiser about 
how to amend their behaviour in accordance with a norm.  There is evidence that 
this also makes participants more hesitant to use punishment.  For example, Cason 
and Gangadharan (2015) have shown that peer punishment is much less frequent 
in CPR games than in linear VCM games, possibly due to the increased 
complexity of the game environment making it more difficult establish a social 
norm.  This increased complexity makes it both more difficult to decide whether 
to punish a participant and more difficult for participants to understand why they 
are being punished (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015).   
 
Clarity about norms becomes even more difficult when heterogeneity is 
introduced into the experimental environment.  In experiments featuring 
heterogeneous actors, counter-punishment becomes a much more likely response 
to enforcement.  Counter-punishment occurs when there is normative conflict 
about what the most appropriate action is for a given decision scenario 
(Nikiforakis et al., 2012).  Reuben and Riedl (2013) tested peer punishment in 
linear VCM games with various forms of heterogeneity (varying both endowment 
and MPCR).  Using surveys, the authors found that participants generally applied 
punishment according to one of two heuristics – the “efficiency rule”, or the 
“equality rule”.  The efficiency rule reflected an expectation that the group should 
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seek to maximise its returns, regardless of who received payment.  The equality 
rule reflected an expectation that each participant should receive a similar 
payment, even if this meant that the group was not as productive overall. 
 
In pollution games similar to those of Segerson (1988), Suter et al. (2009) found 
that a group tax could successfully achieve an efficient pollution level.  However, 
the distribution of abatement between different participants that was observed was 
sub-optimal.  Over- and under-abatement occurred, resulting in a more equal 
allocation relative to an efficient outcome.  Interestingly, these results showed 
neither the efficiency rule nor the equality rule dominating.  It is possible that 
participants may have found some form of compromise between the two 
extremes.  Suter et al. (2009) proposed that this may have been due to inequality 
aversion, but did not have survey data to corroborate this.  This tendency towards 
a preference for more equal arrangements than those predicted by efficient levels 
has also been observed in contracting experiments (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009).   
 
Some experiments have explored how endogenous rule formation can be used to 
counteract some of these challenges and provide clarity about norms and 
enforcement.  Ertan, Page, and Putterman (2009) explored what justifications for 
punishment might be preferred by allowing participants to formulate rules 
controlling when punishment was permitted.  Even with no prior experience, no 
group voted to allow unrestricted punishment and no group allowed punishment 
of high contributors.  While groups began with a preference to avoid punishment, 
over time the punishment of low contributors emerged.  Groups with punishment 
restricted to low contributors exhibited very high levels of cooperation and 
efficiency (Ertan, Page, & Putterman, 2009; Putterman, Tyran, & Kamei, 2011).  
These findings align with the literature on communication and covenants, 
showing the large benefits to cooperation and institutional efficiency when 
operating on the basis of agreed social norms.  More recently, Faillo, Grieco and 
Zarri (2013) made similar findings in relation to “legitimate punishment”, 
particularly when information is provided about pro-social behaviour from high 
contributors.  Such findings are further supported by experiments showing that 
players continue to cooperate, even when punishment is not observed, operating 
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on the assumption and fear that punishment will occur alone (Fudenberg & 
Pathak, 2010). 
 
Providing further support for these findings, studies of common pool resource 
management in the field have shown that while homogeneity helps, it is not a 
necessary requirement for sustaining cooperation.  For example, studies from 
community forestry in Nepal found that heterogeneity was not a strong predictor 
of the level of collective action.  In fact, heterogeneity simply constituted another 
problem that can be solved with effective institutional design (Varughese & 
Ostrom, 2001).  Collective action can be supported even in highly complex 
environments, provided that heterogeneous resource users can agree on an 
appropriate set of rules (Vedeld, 2000).   
 
2.9 Covenants and communication 
 
Communication is being actively omitted from this study, in order to focus more 
clearly on the impact of sanctions and incentives.  This omission necessitates 
some discussion of the impact of communication on cooperation, in order to 
clarify what effects might be expected in its absence, particularly in a complex 
common pool resource management environment. 
 
Communication has long been known to enhance cooperation.  Dawes, McTavish 
and Shaklee (1977) found that even without any kind of sanctioning institution, 
cooperation was significantly enhanced by relevant communication.  Interestingly, 
when communication was not pertinent to contributions, it had little effect (Dawes 
et al., 1977).  Such findings suggest that that the welfare-enhancing effects of 
communication are not due merely to group members knowing one another better, 
but that the use of communication to explicitly develop agreed actions is 
important. The usual use of communication is in the establishment of agreed 
contribution (or extraction) levels that support maximisation of returns to all 
participants (sometimes referred to as “covenants”).  Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 
(1992) showed that such covenants can be effective both with and without an 
associated punishment.  That is, even without the threat of a punishment for 
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defection, communication and the establishment of an agreement can be a 
powerful tool for promoting cooperation (Walker, Gardner, Herr, & Ostrom, 
2000).  In subsequent empirical studies of CPR management groups in the field, 
communication has been identified as one of the key features of successful groups 
(Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor-Tomás, 2010).   
 
Meta-analysis of experiments using communication has found a strong positive 
correlation between communication and cooperation.  This is particularly evident 
in large groups, where cooperation would ordinarily be much more difficult to 
sustain.  While this relationship holds across studies, it is generally strengthened 
when communication is face-to-face rather than written (Balliet, 2010), though 
there are exceptions.  Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006), for example, found that 
the use of an anonymous chatroom was almost as efficient as face-to-face 
communication. 
 
In games exploring communication in the context of contract theory, 
communication has been found to increase both trust and trustworthiness among 
participants, as well as overall payoffs.  While theory would indicate a preference 
for binding contracts, experimental findings indicate that with opportunities for 
communication, contracts in fact become less necessary (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 
2009).  In studies that combine communication with the use of sanctions, threats 
are a common use of communication channels.  Threats can partially substitute for 
costly punishment, resulting in higher overall institutional efficiency (Bochet & 
Putterman, 2009; Vossler et al., 2006).  The use of threats extends beyond merely 
announcing and agreeing contributions.  In an experiment by Dugar (2013), the 
use of approval and disapproval points was substituted for punishment and was 
found to be effective in increasing contributions illustrating the degree to which 
social pressure can have a similar effect to monetary sanctions in incentivising 
pro-social behaviour (Dugar, 2013).  However, in contexts where the use of 
sanctions is available, the credibility of a threat becomes important.  Where 
threats are not followed by sanctions, threats become hollow and ineffective 
(Masclet, Noussair, & Villeval, 2013).   
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Cason and Gangadharan (2016) found that in the absence of communication, 
punishment became relatively ineffective as a mechanism for sustaining 
cooperation in CPR games, in line with the findings of Ostrom, Walker and 
Gardner (1992).  This is significant, as it goes against findings in linear VCM 
games (such as those of Fehr and Gächter (2000)) where punishment alone was 
effective in sustaining cooperation.  The implications for institutional design are 
noteworthy, emphasising the importance of communication and agreed 
contribution levels in more complex environments.  Possible explanations for this 
finding may be the increased complexity of CPR games that makes optimisation 
more difficult (confusion) and inadequate punishment ratios limiting the 
effectiveness of punishment (scofflaws).  Further experiments that systematically 
examine the relationship between incentives and punishment strength are needed 
to untangle the cause of the observed pattern.  
 
2.10 Critical research gaps of interest 
 
Much is known about the influence of norms, communication and monitoring on 
levels of cooperation in both public goods and common pool resource games.  
However, the findings in relation to the use of peer punishment are more mixed 
between different types of game.  In more complex common pool resource 
environments, it has been suggested that peer punishment is less effective.  In the 
absence of communication, it is possible that the complexity of the environment 
leads to confusion about norms and the reasons for punishment.  In this 
environment of uncertainty, participants may become confused about the right 
way to behave in relation to others and may be slow to learn when confronted 
with punishment.  However, these findings are frequently confounded by the lack 
of a systematic comparison between the cost of punishment and the influence of 
the payoff environment.  The work of Kingsley (2015) suggests that when the 
levels of complexity and payoffs are consistent across environments, peer 
punishment has a similar impact on cooperation for both public goods and 
common pool resources.    Given this similarity, it is entirely possible that the use 
of peer punishment responds to cost and incentive environments in common pool 
resource games in the same way as has been shown through systemic testing in 
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VCM environments.  As shown by Nikiforakis (2008), reducing the cost of 
punishment (by increasing the punishment effectiveness ratio) has significant 
effects on the demand for punishment, the overall levels of cooperation and the 
degree of welfare that is achieved.   
 
It remains to be seen whether the use of peer punishment in common pool 
resource games will respond in a similar way.  This is a particularly interesting 
question, as the implication is that the failures of peer punishment that have been 
seen in common pool resource experiments are in fact an artefact of the different 
incentives to cooperate or defect, compared to experiments with the VCM.  If an 
exploration of the relationship between incentives and the cost of punishment in a 
common pool resource environment reveals a similar pattern to that seen in VCM 
games, there is a positive implication for the potential to sustain cooperation in 
common pool resource management. 
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3. Method 
 
The method for this study is set out in a manner typical for economic experiments.  
We begin by outlining the research gap we are addressing and a central 
hypothesis.  This is followed by a description of the contextual factors around 
where the experiments were undertaken and the selection of participants.  We then 
describe the economics of our experimental environment, how our sanctioning 
institutions work and the treatments that have been selected.  Finally, we calculate 
the game theoretic provisions for a cooperative equilibrium (the social optimum) 
and a non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium. 
 
3.1 Hypothesis 
 
A number of experiments with non-linear incentive environments have emerged 
in recent years, featuring peer punishment, group taxes and communication as 
methods of promoting cooperation.  The results have indicated that in the absence 
of communication, peer punishment is only weakly effective in sustaining 
cooperation in non-linear environments (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015).  It has 
been hypothesised by these authors that the increased complexity of non-linear 
environments may make it difficult to identify free riders, and to establish a social 
norm on which to base punishment decisions.  However, it is also important to 
note that the CPR environment in particular includes much higher incentives to 
defect, compared to the typical linear VCM commonly used in experiments 
featuring peer punishment (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
This divergence may change the relationship between punishment effectiveness 
and participants’ willingness to use it.  As the ratio of cost to punishment of 1:3 
that is typically used was demonstrated as efficient in a linear VCM environment 
with lower incentives to defect (Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), a stronger 
punishment ratio may be required to achieve cooperation in non-linear 
environments with stronger incentives. 
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Hypothesis 
Increasing the punishment effectiveness ratio in common-pool resource games will result 
in lower extraction. 
 
This study replicates the recent work of Cason and Gangadharan (2015) featuring 
peer punishment in a CPR environment, which is then extended by varying the 
strength of punishment relative to its cost, as well as the incentive environment.  
We follow the approach of varying punishment ratios used with linear VCM 
games by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), in order to test whether more 
effective punishment can improve cooperation in a non-linear CPR environment.  
Increasing the strength of punishment is used to determine whether the increased 
incentives to defect in this design (compared to typical linear VCM games) can be 
counteracted and increase the overall level of cooperation.  We further corroborate 
our results by testing strong punishment in a higher-payoff environment, to 
determine whether the change in incentives in a similar non-linear CPR 
environment has the same effect on cooperation.   
 
3.1 Location and participants 
 
This study was conducted at the Waikato Experimental Economics Lab, at the 
University of Waikato.  We replicate the conditions in Cason and Gangadharan 
(2015).  Individual observations are made of groups of four students, who 
participate in 10 repetitions of each stage of a CPR game programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).  Participants were paid an average rate of $19.34 NZD per 
hour according to their performance, as is typical for public goods experiments 
employing university students.  Five treatments were conducted, using three 
different degrees of punishment effectiveness and two different payoff 
environments (low and high).  11 to 13 independent groups of four are used for 
each treatment.  In total, we have observations from 232 participants, recruited via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
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3.2 Economic setting  
 
In each period of the game, participants allocate 12 tokens between a private 
account and a public account.  The private return is linear, representing effort 
expended on the next best alternative to resource use.  The payoff from the group 
account is determined by a quadratic function, representing extraction of a 
resource with a maximum sustainable yield beyond which group benefits decline.  
Allocations to the group account impact negatively on other participants, as they 
represent effort spent extracting a resource that generates declining benefits 
beyond a maximum sustainable yield.  In the context of diffuse losses of nitrate, 
this would represent the assimilative capacity of a water body.  This makes the 
experiment rival (Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud, 2006).  Due to the concave shape 
of this group function, both the individual and social optimums are less than the 
maximum level of extraction, but greater than the minimum.   
 
We use the same design as Cason and Gangadharan (2015), consistent with the 
CPR literature following Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992).  Individual payoffs 
(π) are determined by equation 5: 
 
 𝝅𝒊 =  𝑪𝒊 +  𝜶(𝑬𝒊 −  𝒈𝒊) +  
𝒈𝒊
𝑮
𝑭(𝑮), (5) 
 
Where C represents a constant (-12), α represents the return from the private 
account (2), E is the initial endowment of 12 tokens and g represents the 
individual’s chosen contribution to the group account.  The total group 
contributions ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  are represented as G.  Individuals also receive a share of the 
group earnings according to their contribution, expressed as 
𝑔𝑖
𝐺
.  This makes the 
group payoff rival, meaning that an individual’s consumption of the good reduces 
others return from consuming the good.  In addition, individual free riders are able 
to capture a large share of the group payoffs.  This significantly increases the 
incentive for defection compared to linear VCM games, which are not rival.  In 
addition to the CPR environment used in Cason and Gangadharan (2015), we also 
employ a high payoff environment.  This enables us to determine the impact of 
increased incentives to defect on strong punishment, within an otherwise identical 
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economic environment.  The total group payoff F(G) is determined by a quadratic 
function 18G-0.4G
2
 for the low payoff treatments and 24.4G-0.4G
2
 for the high 
payoff treatments, as shown in figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: The group benefit functions used in the CPR experiments. The 
maximum of each curve represents the maximum yield from resource extraction. 
 
  
  
Within these parameters, it is theoretically possible for participants to have 
negative earnings, particularly after punishment in stage two and particularly for 
the treatments with higher punishment levels (as for Cason and Gangadharan 
(2015)).  However, none of our 232 participants had negative total earnings in 
practice.  It is straightforward to introduce a constraint that prevents stage one 
earnings being set to less than zero, as a safeguard against loss of control in this 
type of experiment.  However, this abstracts the experiment further from the 
reality of the field, where negative earnings for any single year are a relatively 
common occurrence due to commodity price volatility (Huchet-Bourdon, 2011).  
Addition of such a constraint would be useful for exploring extreme experimental 
parameters in future research.  For this study, we avoid altering the design to 
introduce a constraint to ensure comparability with the work we are extending. 
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Total payoffs for the CPR environement are the combined total of the individual 
payoffs, plus the total benefits from exploitation of the group resource.  
Punishment is costly and is experienced as a deadweight loss to the group as a 
whole, as is typical in the literature.  The cost is the sum of the assigned 
punishment points (Pa) and the punishment points received (Pr) multiplied by the 
punishment ratio R.  The overall net social benefits accordingly include both the 
gains from resource use and the cost of punishment, as shown in equation 6.  We 
employ identical punishment institutions across the treatments, varying only the 
strength of the punishment relative to its cost.  Table 3 summarises the features of 
the economic environment. 
 
The overall net social benefits (NSB) for the CPR environment can therefore be 
expressed as: 
  
𝑵𝑺𝑩 =   ∑ −𝟏𝟐 + 𝟐(𝟏𝟐 –  𝒈𝒊) 
𝒏𝒊
𝒊=𝟏
+ [𝟏𝟖 ∑ 𝒈𝒊 − 𝟎. 𝟒 (∑ 𝒈𝒊
𝒏𝒊
𝒊=𝟏
)
𝟐𝒏𝒊
𝒊=𝟏
]
−  [∑ 𝑷𝒂𝒊 + 𝑹𝒙𝑷𝒓𝒊
𝒏𝒊
𝒊=𝟏
] 
(6) 
 
Table 3: Outline of key features of the experimental environments 
 Low Payoff High Payoff 
Private return 2 per token 2 per token 
Group return (gi/G)(18G-0.4G
2
) (gi/G)(24.4G-0.4G
2
) 
Punishment ratio (R) None, 1:3, 1:5, 1:9 1:9 
Constant -12 -12 
Nash equilibrium (payoff) 8 (37.6) 11 (64.8) 
Social optimum (payoff) 5 (52) 7 (90.4) 
% Gain from cooperation 38.3% 39.5% 
Maximum payoff from 
defection 
22.4 32 
Observations per treatment 11/44 to 13/52 per 
treatment 
11/44 
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3.4 Punishment 
 
Peer punishment is a feature of most of the treatments undertaken.  This means 
that players in each group can fine other members of their group after seeing the 
extraction levels of all group members.  We employ the approach that is 
commonly used in linear VCM environments.  This allows all participants to 
assign punishment points to any and all players, with no limitations (such as only 
being able to punish defectors).  Participants can assign up to five punishment 
points to each of the other members of their group, at a cost of 1 experimental 
dollar per point.  Initially, the cost-to-punishment ratio is 1:3, meaning a fine of 3 
experimental dollars per point.  This means that any individual can assign a fine 
of up to 15 experimental dollars to each other individual in their group.  This ratio 
of 1:3 has been demonstrated to be the minimum level required to halt the decline 
in cooperation over time in linear VCM experiments and has been in common 
usage subsequently (Cason & Gangadharan, 2015; Nikiforakis & Normann, 
2008). 
 
The incentives to defect are very different in the CPR environment compared to 
the linear VCM environment.  Not only are the incentives to defect much higher, 
they are non-linear (see comparison in figure 3) with stronger or weaker 
incentives to defect at different extraction levels.  In addition, the amount of 
damage experienced by cooperative group members due to the defection of one 
member is more severe.  This changes the ratio of gain received (by the defector) 
to damages caused (to cooperators) by a defection in the CPR game compared to 
the VCM.  These ratios are compared in figure 4.   
 
These differences in the incentives to defect and the consequences of defection for 
others may be affecting the relationship between the cost of punishment and the 
level of extraction that occurs.  In order to provide a logic for the selection of 
different punishment ratios, we examine two different explanations of what is 
necessary for punishment to be effective.  This enables us to cover a much greater 
range in punishment effectiveness across our treatments, while not needing to 
undertake experiments for every possible level of punishment in between.  The 
logic of our explanations focuses on key differences in the gains to defectors and 
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damage to cooperators in the two different incentive environments of the CPR and 
the linear VCM game.  To choose each ratio, we examine the incentive structure 
in the linear VCM and compare it to the incentive structure in the CPR.  We then 
multiply the punishment effectiveness to a point where it is as strong relative to 
the incentives in the CPR as it would be in the linear VCM if it were set at 1:3.  
Because of the complex non-linear relationships in incentives between the two 
games, there are multiple explanations for how the ratio of 1:3 might be 
interacting with particular features of the linear VCM environment to produce 
results where cooperation does not decline over time.  These explanations are 
expanded below and translated into levels of punishment effectiveness for use in 
our CPR games. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of payoffs from defection in linear VCM and low 
payoff CPR games
2
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This assumes the defection of a single individual in relation to three other cooperative individuals 
playing strategies consistent with the social optimum.  This wouls mean zero tokens in the private 
account for the linear VCM and 5 tokens of extraction for the CPR game (evident from the x 
intercepts of the two curves).  
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Figure 4: Comparison of ratios of gain to damage caused by defection in 
linear VCM and low payoff CPR environments
3
 
 
Explanation 1: Punishment levels respond to damage levels 
Our first possible explanation for the difference between the VCM and the CPR is 
that cooperators’ willingness to use punishment is related to the amount of 
damage that they receive, relative to the gains of defectors.  This kind of 
punishment behaviour would indicate a greater willingness to use punishment, in 
order to counteract greater damage caused by defection.  There are several ways 
in which this might play out in relation to the different incentives between the 
linear VCM and the CPR.   
 
First, we examine the ratio of gains to damages for full defection (a contribution 
of 12 in the CPR environment and 0 in the linear VCM).  This gain to damage 
ratio is 1:1 in the linear VCM and 1:1.6 in the CPR environment.  Given that a 
punishment effectiveness ratio three times this is required to halt the decline in 
cooperation in the linear game, we apply the same muliplier to the incentive in the 
CPR environment.  In this case, this implies a punishment effectiveness ratio of 
                                                 
3
 As for figure 3, this assumes the defection of a single individual in relation to three other 
cooperative individuals playing strategies consistent with the social optimum.  This would mean 
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1:4.8 to maintain the same relative strength to the linear VCM.  We round this up 
to 5 to simplify the parameters of the experiment for participants.  In our design, 
this punishment effectiveness ratio also reflects the difference in the average ratio 
of marginal gain to marginal damages between the linear VCM and CPR.  The 
design allows us to test both possible requirements for punishment effectiveness 
simultaneously.   
 
Second, we compare the maximum ratio of marginal gain to marginal damages 
that can occur in the two games.  At 1:2.8, the ratio is significantly higher in the 
CPR game, yielding a punishment ratio of 9 (rounded up from 8.4 to ensure 
sufficient strength and simplicity).  These three approaches to defining 
punishment ratios are summarised in table 4. 
 
Explanation 2: Prospering cheaters 
Our second possible explanation is that willingness to use punishment is not 
directly related to the level of damages received when a group member defects, 
and that the likelihood of defection paying off is the primary driver of punishment 
effectiveness.  This would mean other factors besides damages drive the amount 
of punishment players are willing to use, and whether this level of punishment is 
effective or not is related to the impact that it has on the earnings of defectors.  In 
order to tease this apart, our high payoff CPR treatment is designed with similar 
marginal incentives to the low payoff treatments, but different absolute benefits 
from defection.  For example, if a punishment ratio of 1:9 is successful in the low 
payoff environment, this could mean either marginal gain-to-damage incentives or 
prospering cheaters drive punishment effectiveness.  Success of this ratio in the 
high payoff environment would indicate that marginal gain-to-damage 
relationships are the most important driver of punishment effectiveness.  
However, a failure of this ratio in the high payoff environment would indicate that 
the dominant driver is simply the degree of benefits from defection (as shown in 
table 4).   
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Table 4: Differences in incentives between linear VCM and CPR 
environment and associated punishment ratios 
 
Normal payoff CPR 
 Linear 
VCM 
CPR CPR 
relative to 
VCM 
Punishment 
ratio 
Max gain:damage ratio 1 1.6 4.8 5 
Max marginal gain:marginal damage 
ratio 
1 2.8 8.4 9 
Highest possible payoff through 
defection 
50 146.4 8.78 9 
 
High payoff CPR 
 Linear 
VCM 
CPR CPR 
relative to 
VCM 
Punishment 
ratio 
Max gain:damage ratio 1 2.86 8.57 9 
Max marginal gain:marginal damage 
ratio 
1 2.86 8.57 9 
Highest possible payoff through 
defection 
50 223.20 13.39 14 
 
3.5 Treatments 
 
For this study, the ratio of punishment cost to punishment effectiveness is used as 
a treatment variable.  This approach follows Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), 
who found that a punishment ratio of 1:3 was most efficient in linear VCM 
games.  Cason and Gangadharan (2015) employed the same 1:3 ratio and found it 
to be weakly effective in the CPR environment.  For this study, 1:3, 1:5, and 1:9 
are used as alternative ratios, in order to explore whether more effective 
punishment can counter the increased incentives to defect in non-linear 
environments.  After each round, participants can see all decisions made by all 
participants.  They then have the opportunity to punish any other participants with 
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0-5 punishment points.  In order to further differentiate between our two 
hypotheses, a fifth treatment is undertaken in a higher incentive environment, with 
similar marginal incentives to defect.  The five treatments are summarised in table 
5.   
 
Table 5: Treatments 
Treatment Description 
No punishment 
[CPRP0] 
Control treatment of CPR game without opportunities for punishment 
(replication of Cason and Gangadharan 2015). 
 
1:3 
[CPRP3] 
Peer punishment with 1:3 punishment effectiveness ratio (replication of 
Cason and Gangadharan 2015).  Target any players with 0-5 
punishment points.  Cost to punish is 1 experimental dollar per point 
and imposes a fine of 3 experimental dollars per point. 
 
1:5 
[CPRP5] 
Peer punishment with 1:5 punishment effectiveness ratio. Target any 
players with 0-5 punishment points.  Cost to punish is 1 experimental 
dollar per point and imposes a fine of 5 experimental dollars per point. 
 
1:9 
[CPRP9] 
Peer punishment with 1:9 punishment ratio. Target any players with 0-5 
punishment points.  Cost to punish is 1 experimental dollar per point 
and imposes a fine of 9 experimental dollars per point. 
 
1:9 with high 
payoff 
[CPRP9H] 
Higher-payoff from resource extraction.  Peer punishment with 1:9 
punishment effectiveness ratio. Target any players with 0-5 punishment 
points.  Cost to punish is 1 experimental dollar per point and imposes a 
fine of 9 experimental dollars per point. 
 
3.6 Game Theoretic Predictions 
Low payoff environment 
In the absence of cooperation, we expect individuals to maximise their own 
benefits, assuming other participants will do the same, with the system converging 
to the Nash equilibrium.  For our CPR game design, there are strong incentives to 
defect, with a payoff of 22.4 experimental dollars for defection from the optimum 
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in the lower payoff environment.  The individual payoff function from our low 
payoff CPR economic setting is shown in equation 7: 
 
𝝅𝒊 =  −𝟏𝟐 +  𝟐(𝟏𝟐 −  𝒈𝒊) +  
𝒈𝒊
∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏  
[𝟏𝟖 ∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
  − 𝟎. 𝟒 (∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
)
𝟐
]
−  𝑷𝒂 –  𝑹𝒙𝑷𝒓 
(7) 
 
Analysing the problem with the assumption of rational actors, we can assume 
punishment will not occur.  This is because punishing other individuals comes at a 
cost to the punisher, while conferring no monetary benefit.  Under these 
conditions, rational individuals are not predicted to use punishment.  This allows 
us to ignore this part of the equation in calculating the Nash choice.  As the 
function is strictly concave, a maximum occurs at 𝜋𝑖′ = 0, which in this case 
provides a value for the Nash choice of 8 tokens contributed to the public account 
(extraction from the CPR).  The Nash equilibrium provides net social benefits of 
150.4, as shown in table 6.  In a CPR game, the Nash choice represents a state 
where the individual motivations of participants drive them towards over-
exploitation of the common resource.  This means that resource extraction has 
reached a level beyond peak returns, generating sub-optimal returns to each 
individual. 
 
A social (Pareto) optimum occurs when all participants cooperate in order to 
maximise total social benefits.  This involves optimising all levels of emissions 
with the sole target of maximising net total benefits.  By cooperating and reducing 
overall extraction of the CPR, participants are able to achieve net social benefits 
of 208 if choosing the social optimum amount of 5 tokens, as shown in table 7.  
Returns to individuals are maximised, as the resource extraction is generating the 
maximum sustainable yield. However, it is important to note that if the other three 
group members make choices at this social optimum, an individual defector is 
able to capture net benefits of 74.4 experimental dollars, giving gains for 
defection of 22.4.   
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Table 6: Nash equilibrium predictions for low payoff games 
 Ei gi Individual 
benefits 
Group 
benefits 
Net benefits 
Individual 12 8 -4 41.6 37.6 
TOTAL 48 32 -16 166.4 150.4 
 
Table 7: Social optimum predictions for low payoff games 
 Ei gi Individual 
benefits 
Group 
benefits 
Net benefits 
Individual 12 5 2 50 52 
TOTAL 48 20 8 200 208 
 
High payoff environment 
In our high payoff environment, there are even stronger incentives to defect, with 
a payoff of 32 experimental dollars for defection from the optimum.  The 
individual payoff function from our CPR economic setting is shown in equation 8: 
 
 
𝝅𝒊 =  −𝟏𝟐 +  𝟐(𝟏𝟐 − 𝒈𝒊) + 
𝒈𝒊
∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏  
[𝟐𝟒. 𝟒 ∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
  − 𝟎. 𝟒 (∑ 𝒈𝒋
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
)
𝟐
]
−  𝑷𝒂 –  𝑹𝒙𝑷𝒓 
(8) 
 
As for the low payoff treatments, we can assume punishment will not occur if the 
assumption of rationality holds.  This assumption allows us to ignore this part of 
the equation in calculating the Nash choice and solve for a maximum at 𝜋𝑖′ = 0, 
which in this case provides a value for the Nash choice of 11 tokens contributed to 
the public account (extraction from the CPR).  The Nash equilibrium provides net 
social benefits of 259.2, as shown in table 8.   
 
In the high payoff treatment, participants are able to achieve net social benefits of 
361.6 if choosing the social optimum amount of 7 tokens, as shown in table 9.  In 
the case of a single defector from the optimum in this high payoff environment, an 
individual is able to capture net benefits of 122.4 experimental dollars, giving 
gains for defection of 32.  
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Table 8: Nash equilibrium predictions for high payoff games 
 Ei gi Individual 
benefits 
Group 
benefits 
Net benefits 
Individual 12 11 -10 74.8 64.8 
TOTAL 48 44 -40 299.2 259.2 
 
Table 9: Social optimum predictions for high payoff games 
 Ei gi Individual 
benefits 
Group 
benefits 
Net benefits 
Individual 12 7 -2 92.4 90.4 
TOTAL 48 28 -8 369.6 361.6 
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4. Results 
 
Results are structured according to observations in relation to extraction levels 
(contributions to the group account), the use of punishment, how participants 
respond to receiving punishment and efficiency.  A brief discussion of some of the 
strategies employed by individual participants is also included to provide a sense 
of how the high-level data is formed from the combination of individual 
strategies. 
 
4.1 Extraction levels 
 
If the cost and effectiveness of punishment does not affect the overall levels of 
extraction observed in CPR games, we would expect to find no difference 
between treatments, provided the incentives for cooperation and defection 
remained the same across economic environments.  In our treatments, marked 
differences were found in the average levels of extraction at each different 
punishment effectiveness ratio.  Differences also occurred in the degree of 
extraction over time.  Higher punishment effectiveness ratios produced much 
more constant levels of extraction over time.   
Result one: Stronger punishment results in lower extraction levels 
We find significantly lower extraction levels associated with higher punishment 
ratios.  This decrease in extraction is modest but statistically significant and 
monotonic.  All punishment treatments had significantly lower extraction levels 
than those with no punishment, with stronger punishment showing a more 
significant difference (first row of table 11).  Though a ratio of 1:5 was not 
significantly different to a ratio of 1:3 (p=0.447), a ratio of 1:9 achieved lower 
contributions compared to all other treatments (as shown in the right-hand column 
of table 11).  Figure 5 shows the extraction results over time.  Note the stacked 
lines created by the increasing effectiveness of punishment in reducing extraction 
from the low payoff CPR environment.  Despite the significant improvement with 
stronger punishment, extraction levels were still considerably higher than the 
social optimum of 5, with the lowest mean contribution achieved being 6.86 with 
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a punishment ratio of 1:9 (table 10) in the low payoff environment.  Behaviour 
was less responsive to increased punishment strength compared to results in the 
linear VCM (Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). 
 
Table 10: Mean extraction levels 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  P-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of 
difference in public contribution levels between the first and last five periods are 
in the right column. 
Treatment Periods 1-10 Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Wilcoxon 
signed-rank p-
value 
No punishment 7.59 (2.60) 7.45 (2.78) 7.73 (2.42) 0.706 
1:3 punishment  7.26 (2.60) 7.13 (2.64) 7.40 (2.57) 0.097 
1:5 punishment  7.19 (2.46) 7.10 (2.56) 7.28 (2.35) 0.637 
1:9 punishment 6.86 (2.56) 6.86 (2.60) 6.87 (2.51) 0.549 
1:9 punishment 
high payoffs 
8.81 (2.72) 8.29 (2.74) 9.33 (2.61)
  
0.001 
 
Table 11: Differences in extraction between treatments 
P-values are for Mann-Whitney tests (2-tailed) of difference in extraction levels 
between punishment treatments. 
 1:3 punishment 1:5 punishment 1:9 punishment  
No punishment 0.052 0.006 <0.001 
1:3 punishment  . 0.447 0.001 
1:5 punishment  . . 0.011 
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Figure 5: Mean extraction - low payoff treatments 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean extraction comparing high and low payoff environments 
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Result two: Stronger punishment inhibits decline in cooperation over time 
Although average extraction remained lower in the treatments with punishment 
than those with no punishment, several of our treatments were characterised by a 
decline in cooperation over time, with higher extraction in the later periods.  This 
outcome was particularly marked in the high payoff treatment (see tables 10 and 
12 and figures 6 and 7).  Spearman correlations in table 12 indicate significant 
declines for both the 1:3 punishment treatments and the 1:9 high payoff 
treatments.   
 
Declines were not significant for the no punishment, 1:5 and 1:9 ratio treatments.  
In the case of the no punishment treatment, this is likely to be due to the fact that 
extraction quickly reached a higher level than in the other treatments, remaining 
relatively flat but close to the Nash equilibrium.  In the case of the 1:5 ratio 
treatment, decline appears to be somewhat curbed by punishment.  Extraction in 
the 1:9 punishment treatment was particularly flat with a Spearman correlation 
coefficient of -0.003 and a p-value of 0.952, as shown in table 12.  Table 10 also 
compares the mean extraction levels from the first and last five periods, including 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for significance of differences between early and late 
periods.  Figure 6 illustrates this information, showing the especially marked 
decline in the higher payoff environment. 
 
Table 12: Correlations in extraction over time 
P-values for Spearman correlations (2-tailed) across all 10 periods 
Treatment Spearman p-value 
No punishment 0.215 
1:3 punishment ratio 0.008 
1:5 punishment ratio 0.319 
1:9 punishment ratio 0.952 
1:9 punishment ratio high payoffs <0.001 
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Figure 7: Mean contributions - low payoff treatments 
 
4.3 Punishment – use 
Result three: More effective punishment and higher incomes generate greater 
demand for punishment (punishment is a normal good) 
In all cases, higher punishment effectiveness induced greater use of punishment, 
with significantly greater levels of punishment observed in stronger punishment 
treatments.  This is evident in figure 8, with significance established in table 14.  
In effect, increasing the punishment ratio reduces the cost of a given amount of 
deduction, which generates increased demand.  This finding is consistent with 
previous findings in relation to punishment as a normal good; for example, 
Ostrom et al. (1992) and Nikiforakis & Normann (2008).  In addition to the 
impact of reduced cost, increased income (as observed in the high payoff 
treatment) had a further effect of increased demand for punishment.   
 
The observed level of punishment over time differed markedly between 
treatments (tables 13 and 14).  For the 1:3 punishment ratio, a relatively low level 
of punishment occurred and was constant over time.  Increasing this ratio to 1:5 
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produced initially high levels of punishment, but a decline in use over time.  
Given that this decline in punishment is not associated with a significant increase 
in extraction for this treatment, the implications for efficiency are positive (and 
indeed evident in the significant increase in efficiency over time in table 17).  The 
declining level of punishment in the 1:5 treatment contrasts with the relatively 
constant level of punishment observed in the 1:9 treatment.  Efficiency in the 1:5 
treatment began lower than in the 1:9 treatment due to higher extraction levels, 
but was not significantly different in the latter periods (as shown in table 18) due 
to the decline in punishment costs.   
 
Table 13: Mean payoff reductions received 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  P-values for 2-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests of difference in between the first and last five periods are in the right hand 
column. 
 
Treatment Periods 1-10 Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Wilcoxon 
signed-rank p-
value 
1:3 punishment  4.40   (5.89) 4.79   (5.70) 4.01   (5.89) 0.229 
1:5 punishment 9.81 (11.94) 12.25 (12.63) 7.36 (10.69) <0.001 
1:9 punishment 10.94 (16.93) 10.07 (15.87) 11.80 (17.91) 0.342 
1:9 high payoff 17.89 (20.55) 15.56 (17.84) 20.21 (22.75) 0.052 
 
Higher incomes in the high payoff treatment significantly increased the amount of 
punishment participants were willing to pay for.  However, the quantity of 
punishment demanded increased less than the associated increase in income, in 
the high payoff treatment.  Accordingly, the income elasticity of demand was 
relatively low at 0.66.  
 
By contrast, demand was highly-responsive to price for the initial drop in cost 
from a 1:3 to a 1:5 punishment ratio.  Price elasticity appears to fall rapidly above 
this level, however, as shown by the demand curve in figure 9.  It seems likely 
that the quantity of punishment demanded would continue to increase as the 
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punishment ratio increases further, up to some maximum, but this is an open 
empirical question left for further research. 
 
 
Figure 8: Payoff reductions received in each period 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Demand for punishment at 1:3, 1:5 and 1:9 effectiveness ratios 
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Table 14: Differences in punishment use 
P-values for Mann-Whitney tests (2-tailed) of difference in punishment levels 
between treatments. 
Periods 1-10 
 1:5 punishment  1:9 punishment  1:9 punishment high 
payoff 
1:3 punishment <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
1:5 punishment . 0.044 <0.001 
1:9 punishment  . . <0.001 
    
Periods 1-5 
 1:5 punishment  1:9 punishment  1:9 punishment high 
payoff 
1:3 punishment  <0.001 0.111 <0.001 
1:5 punishment  . <0.001 0.519 
1:9 punishment  . . <0.001 
    
Periods 6-10 
 1:5 punishment 1:9 punishment  1:9 punishment high 
payoff 
1:3 punishment  0.035 <0.001 <0.001 
1:5 punishment  . 0.135 <0.001 
1:9 punishment   . <0.001 
 
Result four: More effective punishment is used to increasingly target defectors 
The distribution of punishment points that were assigned demonstrated a clear 
pattern of targeting defectors, as shown in figure 10.  Because the social optimum 
(and average contribution) is at a level of extraction above the minimum but 
below the maximum, we also observe punishment being assigned to those 
contributing less than the group average.  While it is tempting to attribute this 
result to group norm enforcement, such a claim cannot be made definitively.  For 
example, a number of participants used strategies of maximum extraction (all 12 
tokens) coupled with assigning the maximum number of punishment points to 
every other participant, in order to enforce asymmetrical extraction levels within 
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the group.  While the strategy is certainly not random, it could not be described as 
enforcing a shared norm.  Further information is required regarding participants’ 
attitudes to norms and punishment to decouple these possible explanations. 
 
Figure 10: Payoff reductions received 
 
 
4.4 Punishment – impact 
Result five: The direct impacts of strong punishment interact with the indirect 
effects 
While stronger punishment induced lower extraction levels monotonically, the 
results are less clear cut for the direct relationship between the occurrence of 
punishment and a participant’s response in the following period.  Across all 
treatments, the use of punishment was significantly negatively correlated with 
changes in extraction in the following period (as shown in table 15 below).  This 
means that, in general, the most likely response to punishment was to reduce 
extraction in the next period.  However, the strongest correlation was in fact in the 
weakest punishment treatment.  This strong correlation may be due to aversion to 
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the risk of being punished playing a greater part than the direct impact of 
punishment in the stronger punishment treatments.  That is, it may be that weak 
punishment operated primarily as a social signal, which was then crowded out by 
more effective sanctions in the 1:5 treatment, with the 1:9 treatment introducing 
sanctions effective enough to overcome this crowding out effect.  Similar patterns 
have been documented in relation to the use of incentives (Gneezy et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, the correlation may be an artefact of lower overall extraction in the 
lower punishment treatments.  When group means are lower, the payoff for each 
unit of defection is higher, due to the non-linear group return function.  This may 
make risk-loving individuals less likely to respond to punishment.  Despite the 
noisy relationship between punishment strength and the response to punishment, 
the strongest behavioural amendments clearly occurred where the strongest 
punishment occurred, as shown in figure 12.  The overall correlation between 
payoff reduction and change in extraction was significant at -0.143 (p-value 
<0.001). 
 
 
Figure 11: Payoff reductions received and mean reaction 
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Table 15: Correlations between punishment and change in extraction in the 
following period 
P-values a for partial Spearman correlations (2-tailed), controlling for the effect of 
period.   
Treatment Spearman correlation (p-value) 
1:3 punishment ratio -0.214 (0.001) 
1:5 punishment ratio -0.103 (0.040) 
1:9 punishment ratio -0.195 (<0.001) 
1:9 punishment ratio high payoffs -0.113 (0.019) 
All punishment treatments -0.143 (<0.001) 
 
Result six: More effective punishment can remove the capability for defectors to 
earn more than co-operators 
Increasing the strength of punishment significantly alters the distribution of 
earnings in relation to participants’ deviations from their group mean.  Table 16 
shows the results for 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests establishing 
significance at the 95 or 99 per cent level for most treatments.  The single 
exception is the 1:3 and 1:9 treatments, although it should be noted that a Mann-
Whitney test returned a p-value of 0.048 for this combination. 
 
In the low payoff environment, the highest earners were also the largest defectors 
for both the no punishment and 1:3 punishment treatments.  This finding indicates 
that given the demand for punishment at a ratio of 1:3, insufficient punishment 
occurs to remove the monetary incentive to defect, as the earnings from these 
defections are big enough to offset the likely amount of punishment that occurs.  
This outcome was somewhat moderated by increasing the ratio to 1:5, but the 
highest defectors still earned more than lower defectors.  It was only by increasing 
the punishment ratio to 1:9 that we were able to induce a monotonic decrease in 
earnings associated with higher levels of defection.  This is clearly evident in 
figure 12.  Transferring the 1:9 punishment ratio into our high payoff 
environment, the relationship between defection and earnings returned, as shown 
in figure 13. 
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Figure 12: Earnings from defection - all low payoff treatments 
 
 
Figure 13: Earnings from defection - comparison with high payoff treatment 
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Table 16: Differences in earnings due to punishment 
P-values for 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for difference in the 
distributions of earnings between punishment treatments in the low payoff 
environment (the high payoff treatment is excluded due to earnings not being 
directly comparable).   
Periods 1-10    
 1:3 punishment  1:5 punishment  1:9 punishment  
No punishment <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
1:3 punishment  . <0.001 0.061 
1:5 punishment  . . 0.021 
 
4.2 Efficiency 
 
Efficiency refers to the overall welfare gains or losses that occur relative to the 
self-interested Nash equilibrium.  The efficiency calculation provides an overall 
measure of the welfare impact of a particular institution on an incentive 
environment.  In our case, welfare is a combination of the yields of individuals 
from their private accounts and the yields from the common pool resource, less 
the costs of punishment. 
 
Efficiency is calculated as a proportion of the potential gains from achieving the 
social optimum, relative to the Nash equilibrium earnings, as shown in equation 9. 
 
 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 =  
𝝅𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 −  𝝅𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒉
𝝅𝑺𝒐𝒄.𝑶𝒑. − 𝝅𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒉
 (9) 
 
In our design, punishment is costly and does not convey any direct welfare 
benefit.  Because actual earnings are dependent on the level of punishment points 
assigned and received, efficiency is a function of both extraction and the level of 
punishment that occurs.  Punishment effectiveness, the amount that is used and its 
impact on decisions combine to influence overall efficiency (Nikiforakis & 
Normann, 2008). 
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Result seven: The cost of increasingly severe punishment offsets the welfare 
gains of lower extraction (at least in the short-term) 
All treatments featuring punishment exhibited initial declines in efficiency 
followed by gradual improvements, with a drastic decline in the last period due to 
high levels of punishment (as shown in figure 14).  This feature is interesting in 
and of itself, in that no amendment to behaviour can be expected to be derived 
from punishment in this last period.  Final period punishment appears to be the 
product of participants exercising spite, due to the lack of a fear of reprisal in the 
last period.  As shown in table 17, average efficiencies are negative for all 
treatments with punishment.  There is a significant improvement in efficiency for 
the 1:5 punishment treatments and a significant decline in the high payoff 
treatment.  These differences remain even when omitting the final period from 
analysis. 
 
Table 18 outlines the statistics for differences between treatments.  As is evident 
in figure 14, efficiency levels are in fact highest in the no punishment treatment, 
despite this treatment having the highest overall levels of extraction.  All 
punishment treatments have significantly lower efficiency than the no punishment 
treatment, with some having significantly lower efficiency compared to other 
punishment treatments.  In order of descending efficiency, results were no 
punishment, 1:9 punishment with high payoffs, 1:3 punishment, 1:9 punishment 
and 1:5 punishment.  Interestingly, no significant difference in efficiency was 
observed between punishment treatments for the last five periods.  The 
combination of results suggests that punishment, earnings and overall efficiency 
interact dynamically.  For example, high earnings generate high efficiency 
initially in the high payoff treatment, but the ineffectiveness of a punishment ratio 
of 1:9 in this environment leads to a dramatic decline in efficiency as extraction 
levels increase and earnings decline. 
 
As demonstrated above in result one, stronger punishment is effective in reducing 
overall extraction levels.  Stronger punishment increases the earnings from the 
resource and the total stage one earnings for participants.  However, a significant 
amount of punishment is used to generate these lower extraction levels.  As 
greater punishment occurs in higher-punishment treatments, the modest gains in 
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earnings are offset by the increased costs from punishment.  This result is in stark 
contrast to the findings of Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) when undertaking 
comparative statics analysis of punishment effectiveness in linear VCM games.  
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) found clear, monotonic improvements in 
efficiency associated with increasing punishment effectiveness (particularly for 
latter periods).  The increased complexity of the CPR environment in our design 
generated no improvements in efficiency compared to our control treatment, even 
in latter periods. 
 
Figure 14: Mean efficiency relative to social optimum 
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Table 17: Mean efficiency 
Table x shows mean efficiency levels with standard errors in parentheses.  P-
values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of difference between the first and last five 
periods are in the right column. 
 
 Periods 1-10 Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Wilcoxon 
signed-rank p-
value 
No punishment 0.09 (1.05) 0.07 (1.27) 0.11 (0.78) 0.704 
1:3 punishment -0.16 (1.13) -0.15 (1.19) -0.18 (1.08) 0.679 
1:5 punishment -0.52 (1.20) -0.68 (1.25) -0.35 (1.13) 0.022 
1:9 punishment -0.44 (1.42) -0.38 (1.46) -0.49 (1.38) 0.209 
1:9 high payoff -0.14 (1.11) 0.06 (1.11) -0.35 (1.08) 0.002 
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Table 18: Differences in efficiency 
P-values for Mann-Whitney tests (2-tailed) of difference in efficiency levels 
between punishment treatments. 
Periods 1-10 
 1:3 
punishment 
ratio 
1:5 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 high 
payoff 
No punishment 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 
1:3 punishment  . 0.000 0.048 0.608 
1:5 punishment  . . 0.032 0.000 
1:9 punishment . . . 0.012 
 
Periods 1-5 
 1:3 
punishment 
ratio 
1:5 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 high 
payoff 
No punishment 0.065 0.000 0.002 0.849 
1:3 punishment  . 0.000 0.140 0.063 
1:5 punishment  . . 0.001 0.000 
1:9 punishment . . . 0.001 
 
Periods 6-10 
 1:3 
punishment 
ratio 
1:5 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 punishment 
ratio 
1:9 high 
payoff 
No punishment 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1:3 punishment  . 0.317 0.227 0.243 
1:5 punishment  . . 0.817 0.811 
1:9 punishment . . . 0.786 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Levels of cooperation and extraction 
 
At a high level, this research finds that behaviour in CPR games responds to 
incentives and punishment in a very similar way to the linear VCM game.  In 
particular, incentives to defect or cooperate (defined by the payoff functions) have 
a strong effect on the observed level of cooperation, as does the level of 
punishment that occurs.  Further, punishment behaviour is responsive to price and 
income.  Our hypothesis was that stronger punishment can improve cooperation in 
economic environments with higher incentives to defect, such as is observed 
within CPR games.  The significant reductions in extraction resulting from 
increased punishment effectiveness ratios in our design show this hypothesis to be 
correct.  There is strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the 
strength of punishment has no effect on extraction levels.   
 
This finding is a positive outcome in terms of implications for the management of 
nitrate as a common pool resource.  Even though the incentives to defect are 
strong and coupled to profit, the responsiveness to changes in incentives and 
punishment effectiveness we observe in this study implies that getting the 
institutional settings right in relation to economic incentives can significantly 
improve the chances of success.  One further implication is that any group 
property approach to managing nitrate losses will need to explicitly consider 
volatility, both in terms of how production is affected by the weather and how 
commodity prices affect the relationship between profit and production.  
Volatility means that the incentives to cooperate or defect will change from year-
to-year.  Given that behaviour is responsive to changes in the incentive 
environment, institutional settings will need to explicitly consider this. 
 
Our results are consistent with those of Ostrom et al. (1992), in that a relationship 
was evident between the cost of punishment, demand for punishment and levels of 
cooperation.  Stronger punishment is clearly able to induce higher levels of 
cooperation.  Extraction levels decrease monotonically with respect to more 
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effective, lower-cost punishment.  This finding suggests that the lesser 
effectiveness of peer punishment that has been observed in previous experiments 
in CPR games is not due only to confusion.  The incentive environment and the 
cost of punishment also play a part.   
 
We appear to have a significantly higher propensity for defection in our 
population than that of Cason and Gangadharan.  This is an interesting result 
given the use of identical incentive environments, punishment technologies and 
procedures.  While still finding a punishment ratio of 1:3 to result in extraction 
levels significantly below those without punishment, even at a punishment ratio of 
1:9, our extraction levels were still slightly higher than those of Cason and 
Gangadharan with a punishment ratio of 1:3.   
 
It is also notable that we appeared to have correspondingly greater levels of 
decline in cooperation over time.  Cason and Gangadharan (2015) reported a 
decrease in cooperation over time in the case of their treatment with no 
punishment, and no breakdown over time in their 1:3 punishment treatment.  Our 
no punishment treatment started with high contributions, but stayed at about the 
same level (close to the Nash equilibrium) over time, with a Spearman p-value of 
0.215 (as shown in tables 10 and 12).  Our 1:3 punishment ratio treatment showed 
a clear decline, with a Spearman p-value of 0.008.  Increasing the ratio to 1:5 and 
then 1:9 led to a flatter response evident in this curve.  Given the strong evidence 
of profitable deviations in our experiments with weak punishment (as shown in 
figures 12 and 13), it is perhaps not surprising that we see this pattern.   
 
Introducing peer punishment to the CPR environment has some capacity to 
improve cooperation for some groups, at any level of punishment effectiveness 
ratio.  Even weak punishment can induce a response from some participants by 
acting as a social signal.  The data show some evidence of “crowding out”; in that 
increasing the effectiveness of punishment to 1:5 induced a lesser responsiveness 
to punishment, with the increase to 1:9 counteracting this by removing the 
potential for defection to pay off.  With weak punishment (and indeed, even in the 
absence of punishment), social preferences alone, coupled with the disapproval 
signalled by the use of weak punishment, is sufficient to support cooperation for 
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many groups.  However, this cooperation rapidly breaks down in the presence of 
defectors or participants with more self-interested motivations. 
 
Increasing the effectiveness of peer punishment and decreasing its cost had 
significant positive effects on extraction levels, both in terms of bringing them 
closer to the social optimum and in terms of making extraction levels more stable 
over time.  The implication for our theoretical common-pool resource is positive, 
in that increased punishment results in environmental improvements.  However, 
extraction levels were still significantly above the social optimum with a mean of 
6.86, while the social optimum was 5.  This occurred despite the fact that, on 
average, increased defection from the group average resulted in lower income.  
There are two potential explanations worthy of further consideration here: 
hedging and confusion. 
 
Hedging 
Even among groups with relatively high levels of cooperation (in terms of the 
level of agreement between the group members, as evidenced by their 
contributions), contributions were often still slightly above the social optimum.  
This same effect was observed by Cason and Gangadharan (2015) 
 
In particular, for the CPR treatment with punishment, only 10 percent of 
the individual extraction levels were at the social optimum of 5.  The most 
frequent extraction was 6, chosen 35 percent of the time, and the modal 
extraction was 6 in every period.  The data do suggest some failed 
attempts to coordinate on the social optimum of 5, since the fraction of 
choices on 5 falls in half from periods 1-4 to periods 5-10. Although 
cooperation on an extraction level of 6 rather than 5 is suboptimal, it 
permits subjects to earn nearly the same level of profit (50.4) as the 52 
earned at the social optimum. Importantly, this suboptimal extraction level 
of 6 substantially reduces the incentives to deviate, typically by 10 to 12 
experimental dollars (Cason and Gangadharan, 2015).  
 
Parameterised as it is, the marginal incentives for defection in this CPR game are 
very high.  Overall outcomes are extremely sensitive to even small deviations 
from the optimum as a result.  This sensitivity makes coordination particularly 
difficult, as there are large consequences for small failures.  It is possible that by 
 80 
contributing 6 tokens, groups that are generally cooperative are hedging against 
damage from defection.  However, this is not the only possible explanation. 
 
Confusion 
It is important to note that the CPR game is, fundamentally, very difficult.  
Accordingly, it is quite possible that the choice of 6 out of 12 tokens as an 
extraction level could reflect a small level of confusion, for participants that have 
failed to optimise returns across both the private and public accounts.  In 
calculating marginal returns from the public account against marginal returns 
from the private account, the optimal number of tokens in the group account is 20, 
or 5 tokens for each group member.  However, the maximum payoff from the 
group account occurred at 22 tokens.  Participants can easily make the mistake of 
the optimum being 5-6 tokens, if they are not paying careful attention to the 
marginal returns from the private account as well.  This feature is non-trivial.  
Indeed, while we do not have formal survey evidence to support this, many 
economics students reported the optimum being “5 or 6” tokens, when asked if 
they had a strategy on exit.  A valuable extension to this study would be to present 
a sizeable sample from the same population with the payoff environment and 
query what they believed to be the socially optimal decision.  If it is indeed the 
case that many participants are mistaken about the optimum, then the result of the 
mean extraction level of 6.86 in the treatment with a punishment ratio of 1:9 is, in 
fact, quite good. 
 
There is one further problem of confusion that could cause the observed frequency 
of extraction levels of 6 tokens.  Simply put, participants may be so confused as to 
be unable to apply any clear strategy.  In this case, participants may be simply 
splitting their tokens evenly between the private and public accounts.  Again, this 
possible explanation is well worth investigating with survey evidence.  In either 
the case of hedging or confusion, these possibilities emphasise the importance of 
resource users being able to communicate in order to clarify the best actions for 
both profit and environmental management. 
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5.2 Incentives 
 
Weak punishment is not very effective in improving cooperation for common 
pool resource management in the presence of strongly self-interested participants.  
If defectors find that their earnings exceed any damage they receive as the result 
of punishment, they will quickly learn to extract ever-higher levels.  Self-
interested individuals are able to determine that the costs of defection (even when 
receiving heavy punishment) are easily outweighed by the benefits from increased 
earnings.  This was particularly evident for participants who made large earnings 
early in the game.  By amassing a stockpile of earnings early on, these participants 
were free to pursue aggressive and risky strategies later in the game, safe in the 
knowledge that they already had significant earnings.  This is similar to effects 
observed in industrial organisation games.  For example, if an asymmetry in the 
market develops early on, richer or larger firms are able to operate more 
competitively (even operating at a loss) in order to defeat their competition using 
predatory pricing (Harrison, 1988).  This is an important implication for the 
potential management of nitrate losses as a common pool resource.  While 
communication and social capital might be effective with groups that have come 
together with a sense of common purpose and an environmental goal, this could 
be unstable over time.  Changes in group composition may mean that more self-
interested individuals begin to exploit institutional arrangements if they are not 
designed with the incentive environment in mind.  If payoffs from defection 
cannot be counteracted by sanctions in this context, cooperation may begin to 
break down. 
 
Rivalry in the CPR environment means that behaviour is often even more 
aggressive than predicted by game theory (Van Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006).  In 
some cases, defectors also punished co-operators heavily (for example, extracting 
the maximum 12 units from the CPR as well as assigning five punishment points 
to every other player).  Not only did these defectors have ample income with 
which to purchase punishment, but the effect of punishment on lower earners was 
proportionally much worse.  As the co-operators had much lower earnings, the 
effect of punishment was severe for them, leaving them with very little 
cumulative earnings.  Being left with very low earnings may discourage these 
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individuals from spending money to punish defectors in subsequent rounds.  The 
punishment from defectors sometimes had the effect of driving co-operators’ 
extraction levels down even lower. 
 
A brief discussion of the different payoffs associated with different strategies is 
useful here in developing an understanding of the incentives associated with these 
different actions, and the dramatic effects on earnings of the different extraction 
and punishment strategies.  As covered in section 3.6 regarding game theoretic 
outcomes, the socially optimal contribution in our low payoff incentive 
environment is 5 tokens from each participant, giving them a payoff of 52 
experimental dollars each.  If one individual defects from this level and 
contributes 12, they receive a payoff of 74.4, reducing the payoff for the co-
operators to 38.  Given that the Nash strategy for this game is to extract 8 from the 
CPR, this is an aggressive strategy that reflects an expectation that the others will 
cooperate, enabling asymmetric gains to be captured by the single defector. 
 
Earnings interact with punishment effectiveness.  Assume we use the punishment 
ratio of 1:3 that is commonly used in the VCM literature.  If the defector in this 
case assigns a full five deduction points to all other participants, their individual 
payoffs are reduced by 15, leaving them with 23 experimental dollars from that 
round.  However, even if all three other participants punish the one defector the 
full amount possible, the defector will only receive a deduction of 45 
experimental dollars, leaving the defector with a payoff of 29.4, which is still 6.4 
experimental dollars better off than if they had cooperated.  Even this level of 
difference requires all three defectors acting in concert to punish the defector, 
which is extremely unlikely without communication, given that punishment itself 
is a second-order public good that is subject to free riding in the same manner as 
extraction levels (Chaudhuri, 2011).  Clearly, the punishment effectiveness ratio 
of 1:3 is likely to be woefully inadequate to discourage defection in this incentive 
environment. 
 
Increasing the punishment ratio to 1:5 for this scenario, the payoffs of 74.4 and 38 
for defector and co-operator (respectively), would be reduced to -0.6 and 13 if the 
same punishment strategies were pursued as in the previous example.  Increasing 
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the ratio to 1:9 would leave payoffs at -60.6 and -7.  Of course, this does not occur 
in practice due to free-riding on punishment.  Importantly though, at this level of 
punishment, a single participant is able to destroy all the defector’s gains, 
reducing their earnings to 29.4 experimental dollars.  Even with free riding from 
two other participants, the defector can be discouraged.  Given that punishment 
was usually targeted towards defectors, this explains to a certain extent why 
defectors did not on average earn better than co-operators in this treatment. 
 
In practice, the strategies of co-operators in response to a defector were mixed.  
Insufficient punishment to reduce the earnings of the defector was common.  
Interestingly, many participants responded to high extraction from other group 
members by reducing their own extraction.  If their assumption was that the other 
two participants would continue to cooperate, the optimal extraction level remains 
5 for these three, while the Nash strategy increases slightly from 8 to 9 tokens.  
Contributions below this level either indicate confusion, or a desire to produce 
optimal returns from the CPR regardless of the distribution.   
 
As an extreme example, if a defector extracts 12 and all other participants extract 
0, the earnings of the defector become 146.4 compared to the earnings of 12 from 
other participants.  While this might seem unlikely, the highest earnings before 
punishment of any participant were 103.2.  This is well in excess of what might be 
earned without some participants reducing their extraction levels to compensate 
for defection impacts on the total CPR earnings.  Clearly even the punishment 
ratio of 1:9 is not sufficient to remove the gains from defection in all cases, 
though it was sufficient to do so on average within the results presented in Section 
5 (for example, as evidenced in figure 12). 
 
5.3 Punishment 
The cost of punishment 
As for Ostrom et al. (1992), Carpenter (2002a), Andreoni et al. (2003), Putterman 
& Anderson (2003) and Nikiforakis & Normann (2008), we found the demand for 
punishment to be inversely related to its cost and targeted mostly towards 
defectors.  By decreasing the cost of punishment, we were able to generate 
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increased demand for punishment.  This increased punishment became sufficient 
to remove the ability of defectors to earn more than co-operators, on average.  
Punishment (particularly at the 1:9 level in our low payoff environment) was 
affordable enough for those with low earnings and effective enough to remove the 
advantage accruing to defectors, on average. 
 
The decrease in cost from punishment effectiveness ratios of 1:3 to 1:5 generated 
a large demand response, but the increase in punishment used from 1:5 to 1:9 was 
much more modest, as shown in the demand curve in figure 9.  Further increasing 
the punishment effectiveness ratio is likely to increase demand for punishment 
further, but only by relatively small amounts if the general shape of the demand 
curve is similar to what we have observed.  This is consistent with the diminishing 
marginal returns to punishment evident in the experimental results reported in 
Section 4.  In general, the incentives (particularly marginal incentives) to defect 
are much higher in CPR games.  Accordingly, punishment technologies designed 
to counter the incentives present in the linear VCM game are wholly inappropriate 
in this environment.   
 
Income effects 
Changes to the payoff environment interacted dynamically with the cost of 
punishment.  Increased incomes in our high payoff environment drove much 
higher demand for punishment.  However, the income elasticity of demand for 
punishment was low at 0.66.  This meant that the increase in punishment used by 
participants in the game was insufficient to counteract the effect of much higher 
earnings for defectors, even though the percentage gain for cooperation was held 
constant.   
 
The increased earnings for defectors in our high payoff environment drove a 
pronounced decline in cooperation over time.  While the earnings of co-operators 
also increased, they did not choose to spend proportionally more on punishment.  
Because of this dynamic interaction between incomes, the quantity of punishment 
demanded and the level of defection that occurred, the effect of income on 
punishment behaviour or overall cooperation is likely to be difficult to predict 
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without rigorous evaluation within a specific incentive environment involving a 
specific population.  In the context of agricultural nitrate losses, information about 
the abatement curves of typical farms in the area would be useful to inform 
discussions of what sanctions might be appropriate among users. 
 
5.4 Relationship between incentives, punishment ratio and cooperation 
 
The appropriate punishment ratio for a given incentive environment is a product 
of the interaction between the use of punishment and its impact on defectors.  The 
non-linear incentives of the CPR environment in particular make it difficult to 
establish a clear relationship between economic incentives and the required level 
of punishment ratio except through experimentation.  We began with two 
potential explanations for an effective punishment ratio: 
1. Punishment levels respond to damage levels: where cooperators’ 
willingness to use punishment is related to the amount of damage that they 
receive, due to the gains of defectors.  This behaviour would indicate a 
greater willingness to use punishment, in order to counteract greater 
damage caused by defection.   
2. Prospering cheaters: where demand for punishment is not directly related 
to damages or inequality aversion, and that the likelihood of defection 
leading to high returns being the primary driver of punishment 
effectiveness. 
 
In order to discriminate between these two potential drivers, our design used 
punishment ratios of 1:3, 1:5 and 1:9, in order to provide participants with 
punishment technologies of similar effectiveness to those that are successful in the 
linear VCM, with each ratio assuming a different relationship between the 
incentive environment and the effectiveness of punishment.    
 
While there are strong incentives to defect in our CPR games, pursuit of these 
gains by defectors generates significant damage for co-operators, in that it greatly 
reduces their potential earnings.  We hypothesised that this may induce a response 
to damages effect, where co-operators choose to expend more money on 
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punishment in order to avoid damages from over-extraction by defectors.  In our 
low payoff CPR games, we found that the ratio of 1:5, based on the maximum 
gains and damages achieved in the CPR game (relative to a 1:3 ratio in the VCM 
game) had some effectiveness in reducing over-extraction.  However, this was not 
significantly different to our treatment with a 1:3 punishment ratio. 
 
Within the normal payoff CPR environment, the punishment ratio of 1:9 has two 
possible relationships to a ratio of 1:3 in the VCM environment.  First, 1:9 relates 
to the maximum marginal gains to marginal damages ratio (the point where 
maximum payoffs from defection and maximum damages to co-operators 
coincide).  Second, it relates to the highest possible payoff through defection (the 
maximum gains for defectors that would need to be destroyed in order to 
discourage defection).  This ratio was much more successful, generating 
significantly lower extraction levels and an extremely flat level of extraction over 
time.  Notably, a punishment ratio of 1:9 was able to make the incomes of 
defectors lower than those of co-operators, on average. 
 
Given the two possible explanations for the success of this punishment ratio, one 
further treatment was needed to differentiate between the two.  In our high payoff 
environment, a punishment ratio of 1:9 is in line with the marginal gains to 
damages explanation.  An explanation related to the highest payoff from defection 
would suggest that a higher punishment ratio of 1:14 would be required.  We 
found that a punishment ratio of 1:9 was ineffective in the high payoff 
environment.  A marked decline in cooperation over time was evident, which was 
statistically significant.   
 
Given this combination of findings, the response to damages effect does not 
appear to be present.  This is consistent with the findings of Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2005) in linear VCM games.  Changing the experimental framing to 
provide feedback to participants that includes the stage one earnings of every 
player, as well as their contributions, may induce more punishment from co-
operators.  That is, it is possible that we cannot expect to see decisions based on 
inequality-aversion when we do not communicate to participants the full state of 
inequality that exists.  In the field, the level of wealth accrued from defection may 
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be the more obvious indicator of defection than the level of extraction, this is 
worth consideration in future experimental evaluations, especially those to be 
carried out in the field. 
 
The more important driving factor behind what punishment ratio is effective 
would seem to be whether cheaters prosper.  In order to sustain cooperation over 
the long term, the level of punishment that occurs must reach a high enough level 
that defectors do not earn more than co-operators, as seen in our 1:9 punishment 
ratio treatment for the standard payoff incentive environment.  In institutional 
design for resource management in the field, the cost and effort required to 
sanction defectors to a point where they do not prosper from defection should 
therefore form a useful basis for discussion about the design of robust institutions.  
However, determining this relationship is not likely to be easy or straightforward.   
 
Group members do not select punishment levels by calculating their own damages 
relative to the earnings of others.  Rather, they select punishment based on what 
they feel is worthwhile (in terms of its effectiveness relative to cost) and 
affordable (in terms of their income).  Response to punishment, however, tends to 
be more directly connected to incentives.  It is not until the impacts of punishment 
exceed the potential benefits from defection that we see the decline in cooperation 
over time fully abate.  Accordingly, selection of an appropriate fine level for 
environments featuring peer punishment is not straightforward.  Participants’ 
demand for punishment was inelastic.  This indicates that punishment 
effectiveness ratios must increase more than the incentives to defect in a given 
environment.  This inelastic relationship means that managing changes in 
incentives caused by exogenous factors (such as weather and commodity price 
volatility) becomes more challenging.  If it was a perfect 1:1 relationship, we 
could expect resource users to manage defection with static tools, as an increase in 
incentives to defect would have a corresponding increase in willingness to use 
punishment.  The absence of this effect means it is important that institutions 
explicitly consider volatility. 
 
Figure 15 shows the interaction between different experiment parameters and 
behaviour that was observed in this study.  Punishment cost had a large, nonlinear 
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impact on the overall amount of punishment.  The payoff environment affected 
the amount of punishment, with an income elasticity of 0.66.  The payoff 
environment changed the incentives to defect, with a corresponding positive 
impact on the amount of extraction observed.  Finally, the amount of punishment 
that occurred (as driven by both cost and payoffs) had an impact on the amount of 
extraction that occurred.   
 
It is possible that a theoretical relationship could be derived for these interactions, 
but the amount of data required is non-trivial.  Though this study did not produce 
sufficient data to develop a quantitative model for the relationship between 
punishment cost, payoffs and extraction, the data clearly support some form of 
dynamic interaction that is defined by the relationships of influence represented 
by figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Influence diagram for impacts of punishment effectiveness 
 
 
 
5.5 Efficiency 
 
Of course, reducing resource extraction is not the only concern in effective 
management of common pool resources.  The overall level of welfare accrued to a 
group of resource users from their resource use and institutional constraints is also 
Punishment cost Payoff environment 
Amount of punishment Amount of extraction 
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of interest.  Enhancing efficiency reflects balancing the twin goals of achieving 
environmental outcomes while still enabling profitable farming.  Our findings in 
relation to efficiency are clearly in line with the findings of Ostrom et al (1992), in 
that “swords without a covenant may be worse than the state of nature”.  While 
we were able to significantly improve the extraction levels for our common pool 
resource, the overall welfare effect of including punishment was negative. As for 
Janssen, Holahan, Lee, & Ostrom (2010), all of our treatments had initial declines 
in efficiency, followed by gradual improvement.  Spiteful punishment in the final 
period had a large effect on final period efficiency.  On the whole, efficiency was 
poor, with all treatments that included punishment having worse total welfare 
outcomes than the treatment without punishment.   
 
While the findings for efficiency in this study were poor, it is possible that more 
periods would enable this to improve (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008).  The 
increased complexity of the CPR game compared to the linear game clearly makes 
determining an optimal contribution level more difficult.  This increased 
complexity is also likely to inhibit learning, slowing participants’ response to 
feedback (Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 2006).  First, interpreting the contributions of 
others would be more difficult.  Second, understanding the reasoning behind the 
punishment behaviour of others would be more difficult.  Participants that are 
repeatedly punished for their behaviour, but with little understanding of the 
reasons why this is done, are likely to experience a form of learned helplessness, 
wherein they default to repeating a passive strategy (such as undertaking zero 
extraction).   
 
5.6 Implications for collective management of water quality 
 
This research is a positive story for self-governance of the commons.  Our 
experimental results show clearly that members of a group faced with a common 
pool resource dilemma respond to incentives in the same way that is expected for 
other types of social dilemma.  In the context of collective management of nitrate 
losses, this means institutional design should consider the incentives to defect, and 
the costs of effective punishment to counteract this.  With design taking careful 
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account of the abatement costs and profit functions of typical farms in a particular 
area, the likelihood of successful management will be enhanced. 
Communication and social capital will still have an important role to play, but this 
should perhaps be considered differently than purely in terms of effects on 
cooperation.  Given that low-cost, strong punishment can be effective in 
preventing declines in cooperation over time, the role of communication becomes 
primarily one of supporting efficiency.  The large degree of complexity involved 
in managing common pool resources means that communicating about the right 
actions to take (and when) is important to establishing agreed norms for resource 
use.  In the field, this is likely to be further complicated by the introduction of 
heterogeneity, as norms for resource use may not necessarily be exactly the same 
for different types of operation.  Volatility caused by weather and commodity 
prices will also have implications for the role of communication.  As the 
incentives change from one year to the next, maintaining a shared understanding 
of norms through on-going engagement is likely to be important.  
 
If preventing a decline in cooperation over time were wholly dependent on good 
communication, then we might expect community governance to be fragile.  
Inevitably, community groups will experience breakdowns in communication, 
changes to the group composition and other disruptions.  If communication were 
critical to sustaining resource use levels, then these disruptions would become 
perilous for maintaining the resource.  However, if communication is primarily 
supporting efficiency, then temporary disruptions to this part of the institution are 
not likely to be fatal.  Effective sanctions and rules could potentially operate in the 
absence of good communication for a time, with only a temporary implication for 
efficiency.  
 
This being said, given the great expense associated with the use of sanctions 
without communication, it is clear that this would not be a desirable arrangement 
for governing a common pool resource.  In the interest of welfare maximisation, 
the use of communication and threats are essential to avoid the significant costs of 
using costly sanctions.  The combination of communication and sanctions is likely 
to better support meeting environmental outcomes and maintaining profitable 
farms.  The task of optimising resource use in our laboratory environment is 
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difficult, generating significant amounts of confusion.  It would be hard to 
overstate the greater level of complexity that is associated with managing the 
resource effectively in the field, compared to our stylised representation of the 
problem in the laboratory.  Communicating and working together to develop 
shared understanding of the twin problems of optimising farm profit while 
managing a cumulative impact on a common resource is essential. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 The relationship between incentives, punishment and cooperation in 
common pool resource games 
 
In our experiments, a clear relationship was shown between the strength of 
punishment and the level of resource extraction that occurred. Participants 
responded clearly to incentives, even in the absence of communication.  While the 
highly-complex environment of the common-pool resource experiment makes 
coordination difficult without communication, this research shows that it can 
clearly be improved. 
 
Punishment effectiveness (and its cost) has a strong effect on the amount of 
punishment that is demanded by individuals within the CPR game.  In addition, 
the income of individuals affects the quantity of punishment that they purchase.  If 
this level of punishment is able to remove the ability of participants to earn more 
through defection than they would through cooperation, levels of resource use can 
be sustained over time that are well-below the Nash equilibrium. 
 
The incentive structure of the economic environment also has a profound effect on 
whether cooperation can be sustained.  While raising incomes can increase the 
quantity of punishment people are willing to purchase, it also increases the 
income from defection.  The propensity to increase punishment does not increase 
at the same rate as the payoffs from defection.  This means that higher stakes 
require stronger punishment ratios.   
 
If the dynamic interaction between the incentive environment and the cost of 
punishment can be managed to provide a sufficient quantity of punishment to 
reduce the earnings of defectors, cooperation can be sustained over time.  
However, this may still be at sub-optimal levels due to hedging against defection 
or confusion about the optimal level of extraction. 
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6.2 Limitations and future extensions 
 
The primary limitation of this study has been the failure to provide an explanation 
for the continued gap between the optimal level of extraction and the observed 
level of extraction, even in highly cooperative groups with stable levels of 
extraction.  The possible explanations of hedging or confusion both remain extant.  
Survey work would be valuable in disentangling these two factors.  Directly 
informing participants of the social optimum and Nash equilibrium levels of 
extraction would potentially provide a strong priming effect, but it is questionable 
whether it would have a much different effect relative to the linear VCM setting, 
given that the optimal contribution levels are much more obvious to participants 
in that context.  In any case, in the field it is likely that decisions about allocation 
and extraction levels would be made ex-ante, making navigation of the 
complexity of optimisation much more straightforward for resource users.  
 
Communication is well known to improve levels of cooperation.  Given that an 
environment with no communication is unlikely to be found in the field, this 
makes the experiments slightly artificial.  It would be an interesting extension to 
repeat the same experiments with the inclusion of communication, to determine 
whether altering the punishment ratio still has any significant effect on the overall 
levels of cooperation observed.  Perhaps limited or imperfect forms of 
communication could bring the scenario closer to that observed in the field. 
 
It is a notable feature of the punishment technology that we have used that as the 
punishment ratio increases, the tool becomes increasingly coarse, as punishment 
increases in ever-larger increments.  It may be worthwhile to consider punishment 
technologies that enable smaller increments at the same cost.   
 
Finally, the realism of the experimental environment could be greatly improved 
by the introduction of uncertainty or variability.  As detailed in the background 
section, non-point source pollution is characterised by both uncertainty and 
variability.  Variations in payoff functions from period-to-period would provide 
interesting insights as to how cooperation is affected by under- or over-sensitivity 
to rare events.  A more ambitious design (likely requiring many more periods to 
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enable sufficient time for learning) could also include incomplete information 
about payoffs in order to investigate the experience-description gap. This provides 
more realism, but also complicates the decision task in what is already a complex 
experimental environment. 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks  
 
In the presence of some form of external threat or regulation associated with the 
degradation of water quality, the diffuse loss of nitrate to waterways is 
transformed into a common pool resource problem.  This social dilemma is 
characterised by strong incentives to defect and challenging levels of complexity.  
However, these challenges are not insurmountable. 
 
Due to the complexity of common pool resource management, communication 
and agreement about norms for resource use levels is important to support groups 
in optimising environmental outcomes and profitability.  Communication is a 
necessary condition for maximising welfare when navigating complexity.  
However, communication is not necessary to improve environmental outcomes or 
sustain a level of resource use over time. 
 
Sanctions are a critical part of the sustainable management of common-pool 
resources.  While some self-selected groups of highly cooperative individuals may 
be able to sustain cooperation in the absence of sanctions, these arrangements are 
unlikely to be stable over time.  The presence of defectors means that some form 
of recourse to punishment is necessary to support the continued sustainable 
management of a resource.  This has been well-established through data from both 
laboratory experiments and the field (Ostrom, 1999).  The strong incentives for 
defection in common pool resource management, including collective 
management of water quality, can be overcome by sufficiently strong sanctions.   
 
Our experimental findings suggest that sanctions administered by peers can be 
effective in improving environmental outcomes and stabilising the level of 
resource use over time, preventing the decline in cooperation that is in evidence 
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where individuals are able to profit from defection.  The cost and effectiveness of 
sanctions has a strong interaction with the nature of the incentive environment.  In 
designing institutions for the collective management of nitrate loads to water 
bodies, regulators and groups of resource users must consider the incentives for 
defection that are driven by the degree of coupling of nitrate losses and 
profitability in farm systems.  In order to be successful, group members must have 
access to low-cost sanctions that are designed with the incentive environment in 
mind.  If institutions can be designed in such a way as to ensure that cheaters do 
not prosper from defection, the prospects for collective management of water 
quality are positive. 
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8. Appendix: Instructions for a 1:9 punishment experiment 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment on decision making. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a 
considerable amount of money. All earnings on your computer screens are 
in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to 
real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of  
 
___ Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar. 
 
Today’s session will be conducted using the computer network located 
here in this laboratory. It will be divided into 10 different periods. Attached 
to these instructions you will find a sheet labelled Personal Record Sheet, 
which will help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you 
might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone.  It is your 
own private information.  
 
You have been assigned to a group of four (yourself and three other) 
participants. This will be your group for the entire session.  
 
The First Stage each Period 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives an endowment 
of 12 tokens. In Stage 1 each period you (and the others in your group) 
must decide how many tokens to place into either or both of 2 accounts: a 
private account and a group account. All tokens must be placed in one 
account or the other. Each token you place in the private account 
generates a return to you (independent of what anyone else does), and 
each token you place in the group account generates a return that 
depends on how many tokens that others in your group place in the group 
account. Your earnings in a period are the sum of your earnings from the 
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private account and your earnings from the group account, minus 12. 
Returns to the two accounts are listed on your input screen as shown on 
the next page. Everybody has the same returns.  
 
You and all the other members of your group will each get a share of the 
total group earnings that depends on your token placements. If a total of X 
tokens are placed in the group account by group members, then the total 
group payoff is 18X – 0.4X2 Experimental Dollars. For example, if a total of 
10 tokens are placed in the group account, the total group payoff is 
(18×10) – (0.4×100) = 180 – 40 = 140. This amount, along with every 
other possible total token placement in the group account is shown on 
your input screen below.  
 
Your share of this total group payoff equals your number of tokens placed 
in the group account as a fraction of the total tokens you and the others in 
your group place in the group account. For example, if a total of 10 tokens 
are placed in the group account, and you placed 2 of these 10 tokens, 
then you receive 2/10 = 0.2 of the 140 total group payoff, or 0.2 × 140 = 
28.  
 
Your private account generates a return to you that depends only on your 
tokens placed in the private account. In particular, you will receive 2 
Experimental Dollars for each token that you place in your private account.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
You will indicate your decisions on the input-screen for the first stage: 
 
 
Since your endowment each period is 12 tokens, the two numbers you 
indicate on your input-screen must be whole numbers between 0 and 12 
and must sum to 12. After entering your decision you must press the 
Continue button. Once you have done this, your decision has been made 
and cannot be changed. 
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After all participants in your group have made their decisions the following 
income screen will show you the total amount of tokens placed in the 
group account by all four participants of your group (including you). Also 
this screen shows your earnings for the first stage of the period. Your 
earnings are the sum of your earnings from the private account and your 
earnings from the group account. During the experiment you will record 
this information on your hardcopy record sheet and then click the 
Continue button.  
 
Detail of Results Screen for First Stage 
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The Second Stage each Period 
 
In the second stage you will see the amount of tokens placed in the group 
account by all four participants of your group. Moreover, in this stage you 
can decide whether to decrease the earnings received from the first stage 
of the others in your group by assigning deduction points. These other 
participants can also decrease your first stage earnings if they wish to. 
This is apparent from the input screen at the second stage, shown below. 
 
 
 
Your allocation to the group account is displayed in the first column, 
while the allocations to the group account by the other people are shown 
in the remaining three columns. Note that the order in which others’ 
allocations are displayed will be determined at random in every period. 
The allocation in the second column, for example, could represent a 
different person in different periods. The same holds true for the other two 
columns. 
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You will have to decide how many deduction points to assign to each of 
these other three participants in your group. You must enter a number for 
each of them. If you do not wish to change the earnings of a person in 
your group then you must enter 0. You can assign up to 5 points to each 
participant.  
 
You will incur costs from assigning deduction points. Every deduction point 
you assign costs you 1 Experimental Dollar. For example, if you assign 2 
deduction points to one person, this costs you 2 Experimental Dollars; if, in 
addition, you assign 4 deduction points to another person this costs you 
an additional 4 Experimental Dollars. In total for this example you will have 
assigned 6 points and your total costs therefore amount to 6 
Experimental Dollars.  
 
After you have assigned points to each of the other three participants you 
can click the button “Calculate” (see the second stage input screen). On 
the screen you will then see the total costs of your assigned points. As 
long as you have not yet clicked the Continue button, you can still change 
your decision. To recalculate the costs after a change of your assigned 
points, simply press the “Calculate” button again.  
 
If you assign 0 deduction points to a particular participant (i.e., enter “0”), 
you will not alter his or her first stage earnings. However, if you assign one 
deduction point to a participant you will decrease his or her first stage 
earnings by 9 Experimental Dollars. If you assign a participant 2 
deduction points you will decrease his or her first stage earnings by 18 
Experimental Dollars, and so on. Each deduction point that you assign to 
another person will reduce his or her first stage earnings by 9 
Experimental Dollars. Similarly, each deduction point assigned to you by 
another participant will reduce your first stage earnings by 9 Experimental 
Dollars: 
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Costs of received deduction points = 9 × Sum of received deduction points. 
 
How much the first stage earnings are decreased depends on the sum of 
deduction points received. For instance, if somebody receives a total of 3 
deduction points (from all other participants in this period), his or her 
earnings would be decreased by 27 Experimental Dollars. If somebody 
receives a total of 4 deduction points, his or her earnings are reduced by 
36 Experimental Dollars. Your total earnings from the two stages are 
therefore calculated as follows:  
 
Total earnings at the end of the second stage = period earnings = 
= Earnings from the first stage – 9 × (sum of received deduction points) 
– (sum of deduction points you have assigned) – 12 
 
Note that everyone has a fixed amount of 12 Experimental Dollars 
subtracted every period.  
 
After all participants have made their decision, your earnings from the 
period will be displayed on a screen such as the one shown below. After 
you have viewed the earnings screen the period is over and the next 
period commences. Recall that 10 periods will be conducted. 
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Recording Rules 
 
During every period you should write down the information shown on your 
results screens on your Personal Record Sheet. The Stage 1 results 
screen shows the group account allocations you should record, and the 
final earnings screen shows your Deduction Points and period earnings. 
Be sure to record your total earnings for each period in the rightmost 
column. 
 
Summary  
 
1. All subjects use the same Earnings Tables. 
2. In each period, you and every other participant will each have 12 
tokens to allocate. 
3. In each period, you will decide how many tokens to place in your 
private account and how many to place in your group account. You 
must allocate all 12 tokens each period. 
4. Your earnings from the private account depend only on your 
decision about how many tokens to place in this account. 
5. Your earnings from the group account depend upon how many 
tokens you and the other three participants of your group place in 
this account. You receive a share of group earnings that depends 
the fraction of the total tokens in the group account that you placed 
in the group account.   
6. You may assign up to 5 Deduction Points to each of the other 
individuals in your group. Each point you assign costs you 1 
Experimental Dollar.  
7. These other individuals can assign Deduction Points to you. Each 
Point assigned to you reduces your earnings by 9 Experimental 
Dollars.  
8. You will interact with the same three other individuals for all 
decision periods. 
9. Results and earnings should be recorded on your Record Sheet at 
the end of each period. 
 119 
Detail of Earnings Screen at the end of the Second Stage: 
 
 
 1 
Personal Record Sheet 
 
Period 
number 
My 
Tokens 
in Private 
Account 
My 
Earning
s from 
Private 
Account 
My 
Tokens 
in Group 
Account 
Total 
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